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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TIJE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY 
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT, 1 
1 Case No. CV-05-4852 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
VS. 1 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
1 PROPERTY AND DEBT 




1. On July 3, 2007, the court issued its "Decree of Divorce;" on August 30, 
2007, the court issued its "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 011 Grounds for 
Divorce, Child Custody and Child Support" and its "Order on Grounds for Divorce, 
Child Custody and Child Support and Rule 54(b) Certificate." On September 10, 2007, 
the court and counsel met infor~nally in chambers for a conference on a few property 
FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS ON PRQPgRTY, DEBT & FEES 
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issues. In this doculllent, the court inaltes its findings of fact and conclusions of law on 
the re~naining issues in this case. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
ISSUES OF PROPERTY AND DEBT 
2. Idaho Code 9 32-903 states: 
All property of either the husband or the wife owned by him or her 
before marriage, and that acquired afterward by either by [sic] gift, bequest, 
devise, or descent, or that which either he or she shall acquire with the 
proceeds of his or her separate property, by way of rnoneys or other 
property, shall remain his or her separate property. 
3. The court finds that the party shown below owned the following property 
before marriage or acquired it afterward directly by---or using the proceeds of-gift, 
bequest, devise, or descent: 
Gregory's Separate Property 
Description 
before marriage 
Real property at 3580 Mobile Drive 
(Singlewide) 
Property identified as Gregory's 
separate property in the parties' 





Debt owing to Bonneville County for 
property taxes on 3580 E. Mobile 
$6,296 reimnbursement claim against 
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See Plaintiffs Exhibit 26. 
See explanation below. 
coinmunity estate for separate 
property contribution to purchase of 
681 Katie Court 
Greg's recliner 
i 
Church related books Gregory owned Stipulation 
Ann's Separate Property 
Descrintion 1 Cnmments 
1 Four horses (Stormy, Cherokee, 1 Stipulation 1 
Lion King I & I1 
Church related books Ann owned I Stioulation 
__Misty, Shadow, ~ i g e r )  
Piano 
rra~npoline 
Extra long log chain 
Movies: Air Bud, Beethoven I & 11, 
before marriage 






I 1 property in the parties' written - 1 - - .  
Stipulation (De^fendantrs Exhibit M) 
6/13 interest in mobile home located I Stipulatio~z 
. - .. , - - - 2  . - I 
Bandsaw Gift i 
4. Idaho Code 5 32-906 states: 
All other property acquired after ~narriage by either husband or wife 
is community property. 
5. At trial, both parties stipulated that the court should make an equal division 
of their colnmuliity property and debts. 
6.  The court finds that the parties acquired the following property during the 
marriage by mealis other than gift, bequest, devise, or descent, and that none of the listed 
property represents proceeds fioin separate property. The court also fiiids that the parties 
incurred the following debts during the marriage. The court finds that the following 
property is colntnunity property, that the following values are the fair market values of 
each listed item, that the following debts are colnlnunity debts, and that the division 
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indicated below is substantially equal. The court will divide the colnrnunity property and 
the responsibility for paying the coininunity debts as follows: 
Description 
Real property in 
Etna. Wvoining' 
Comments 
When Ann and Kevin Spencer 
divorced in April 1996, the Lincoln 
County Wyoining divorce court 
awarded to Ann this real estate in Star 
Valley, Wyoining that the parties call 
the "Etna property." 
When Ann and Gregoly married, 
Ann owed $123,961 on a debt to 
Countrywide Home Loans secured by 
the Etna property. During the 
marriage of An11 and Gregory, the 
parties made payments on that debt, 
and by August 12, 1999, they had 
reduced the balance by $2,141 to 
$121,820. Ann made the lnonthly 
payments on the debt to Countrywide 
Mortgage froin her checking account. 
Into that account, she deposited the 
monthly child support she received 
from Kevin Spencer, the rental income 
she received froin her separate 
properties, and $350 to $400 Gregory 
provided each inonth froin his 
ernployinent income. 
On August 12, 1999, Ann sold a 
portion of the property (about 2.5 
acres) and a inobile home to Eric and 
Dawn Loveland for $88,500. To close 
on that sale, Ann had to pay off the 
existing mortgage debt owing to 
Countrywide. To pay that debt, she 
and Gregory borrowed $34,512 from 
I This item excludes the proceeds fro111 the Wyoming 100 sale in the trust accourrt of Woolf, Co11lbo & 
Tliompso~~ but includes ally other interest in the Wyomil~g 100 contract for develop~ne~~t  ofthe Etna 
property. 
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the Bank of Star Valley (BSV), giving / 
a promissory note that they both 
signed. Ann also signed a quitclairn 
deed conveying the remaining Etna 
acreage to "Ann Barrett and Gregory 
Barrett, Wife and Husband as Tenants 
by the Entireties," and then she and 
Gregory signed a new mortgage in 
favor of BSV, pledging the property tc 
secure repayment of the $34,512 loan. 
Ann signed all of the doculnents 
(the deed to the Lovelands, the 
quitclaim deed from Ann to Ann and 
Gregory, and the prolnissory note and 
mortgage to BSV) during the closing. 
An11 testified that she signed the 
quitclaim deed simply because it was 
placed in front of her at the closing an1 
was required for the new loan. She 
testified that she would not have 
signed the quitclaim deed had she 
understood that she was giving 
Gregory a half interest in the property. 
Until the winter of 2003, Ann 
made the monthly payments on the 
debt to BSV from her checking 
account. (As noted above, into that 
account, Ann deposited the child 
support she received from Kevin 
Spencer and the monthly allowance 
Gregory provided from his 
elnployinent income.) In the winter of 
2003, the parties started a joint 
checking account, and Ann began 
lnalcing the payrnents from that 
account. The parties have now 
reduced the debt by $11,63 1 to 
$22,881. 
Gregory contends that Ann's 
signing the quitclaim deed transmuted 
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the Etna real estate into colninunity 
property; Ann concedes that the 
community estate has a claim against 
her separate estate for the $13,772 
reduction in principal of the 
Countrywide and BSV debts, but she 
contends that the real estate remained 
her separate property. 
"[A] husband and wife may elect 
at any time to change their property 
rights." Stockdale v. Stockdale, 102 
Idaho 870,873,643 P.2d 82,85 (Ct. 
App. 1982). Accord, Suchan v. 
Suchan, 106 Idaho 654,660,682 P.2d 
607,613 (1984). Idaho Code § 32-915 
allows spouses to transmute separate 
property into coinlnunity property by 
following certain formalities. It states: 
"All contracts for marriage settlelnents 
must be in writing, and executed and 
acknowledged or proved in like 
inanner as conveyances of land are 
required to be executed and 
aclcnowledged or proved." (A 
conveyance of land requires an 
"instrument in writing, subscribed by 
the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or 
by his lawhl agent thereunto 
authorized by writing." Idaho Code $ 
9-503.) Here, the quitclaim deed 
signed by Ann nleets the requirelnents 
of Idaho Code 32-917. 
When one spouse claims that 
the other spouse intended to transmute 
property or to ~nalte a gift, the burden 
is on the party making the claim to 
prove the intent in question by clear 
and convincing evidence. Ustick v. 
Ustick, 104 1daho 215,222,657 P.2d 1 
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1083, 1090 (1983). Generally, a 
quitclaim deed executed with the 
formalities required by Idaho Code $ 
32-917 is sufficient to meet that 
burden of proof. See, e.g. ,  Bliss v. 
Bliss, 127 Idaho 171,898 P.2d 1081 
(1995); Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483, 
777 P.2d 255 (1989). "'Where the 
language of a deed is plain and 
unambiguous, the intention of the 
parties nlust be determined from the 
deed itself, and par01 evidence is not 
admissible to show intent." Hall v. 
Hall, I16 Idaho 483,484,777 P.2d 
255,256 (1989). Accord, e.g., Bliss v. 
Bliss, 127 Idaho 171,898 P.2d 1081 
(1995). Here, the deed is plain and 
unambiguous. 
Ann notes that in Hoslcinson v. 
Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448,80 P.3d 
1049 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Cour 
affirmed the trial court's conclusion 
that the wife had not proven 
transmutation by clear and convincing 
evidence even though the husband 
signed a quitclaim deed conveying his 
interest in the property to hiinself and 
his wife. Hoslcinson, however, is 
distinguishable from the present case. 
In Hoslcinson, two deeds were signed 
on the same day: the husband signed 
one deed purporting to convey the 
property to himself and the wife; the 
wife signed the second deed conveying 
the property to the husband. The 
evidence did not establish which deed 
was signed first. The deeds 
contradicted each other. Because the 
language of the deeds was not "plain 
and unambi~uous." the court could no1 
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"determine the intention of the parties 
. . . froin tile deed itself." I-lall v. Hull, 
116 Idaho 483,484,777 P.2d 255,25t 
(1989). The ambiguity created by the 
dual deeds justified the court's 
considering parol evidence of the 
parties' intent. See Hull v. Hull, supra 
That parol evidence led the court to 
find that the parties intended no 
transmutatio~~. 
I-lere, the deed shows no 
ambiguity, and the court finds that it 
transmuted the Etna real estate fronl 
separate property to cornlnunity 
property. 
When the Lincoln County divorce 
court awarded this property to Ann in 
April 1996, it was worth about 
$160,000. (Ann's equity was about 
$34,000.) Ann and Gregory disagree 
on the current fair inarket value of the 
property. 
The court received in evidence 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 32, a September 
2006 appraisal report by Thoinas Ogle, 
a Certified General Real Estate 
Appraiser; the court also heard 
testimony hoin Mr. Ogle, Gregory anc 
Ann. Gregory opined that Mr. Ogle 
undervalued the property by failing to 
give appropriate weight to a contract 
relating to developlnent of the 
property. (See footnote 2 below.) Mr. 
Ogle testified that adding value for the 
possible development would be undulj 
speculative. Ann agreed; she opined 
that the contract did add any value to 
the property. Mr. Ogle was the only 
expert witness to testify concerning the 
fair inarket value. 
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to Bank of Star 
Thompson 
Real property at 278 
/Contor (lot ($15000) 
~ecause  the court has decided to awarc 
the Etna property to the parties as 
tenants in cornmon, the court need not 
deterlniile the fair rnarltet value of tlie 
See above. 
In September 2005, the parties 
sold a portion (about 2 acres) of the 
Etna property to Wyoining 100, LLC 
("Wyoming 100") for $50,000.2 The 
proceeds were placed in the trust 
account at Woolf, Co~nbo & 
Thomnpson. (The parties agreed that 
the sale would have no iinpact on 
characterization of the Etna property a: 
coininunity or separate. See 
Defendant's Exhibit F.) 
During the September 10, 2007 
informal conference in chambers, 
counsel agreed that the court should 
place one-half of this fund in the 
control of each party but that such 
allocation would have no iinpact on 
the characterization of the funds as 
coinlnunity or separate property on 
I appeal. 
$67,000 1 Gregory bought this lot for $9,000 
I before marriage; he also owned a 
As additional consideration, Wyorniilg 100 agreed to build a feiice and provide a mechanized pop-up 
irrigation system. Wyoming 100 also agreed to pave up to 400 lineal feet of street and provide stubs for 
water, power and telephone for a five-lot subdivisio~l on the parties' property. The contract required 
Wyoini~ig 100 to begiii co~~structio~i by December 2006, but Wyo~niilg 100 has not started any 
develop~nellt yet; it is uncertain when developi~~ent i ight begiii. 
To help illsure that the lots could be developed, Grego~y filed an applicatioil to change the 
highway access from agricultural to resideiltial. The parties also spent about $400 to replace a strip of 
fence on tlie property; tlie evidence did not address whether that expenditure enhanced the value of the 
propel* 
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and double wide 
mobile home 
($52000)) 
singlewide mobile home situated on 
the lot. During the marriage, the 
parties constructed a cement pad on th 
lot, and on about November 29,2001, 
they replaced the singlewide mobile 
home with a doublewide mobile home 
To buy the doublewide home, the 
parties borrowed $3 1,152 from the 
Bank of Commerce (BOC). Both 
Gregory and Ann signed the 
promissory note. The noted provided 
that it would be secured by a deed of 
trust on the mobile home. By making 
monthly payments, the parties reducec 
the BOC debt by $9,830 to $21,322. 
On December 27,2004, tlie parties 
borrowed $45,000 from Wells Fargo 
Bank; both parties signed the 
promissory note. They used $21,322 
to pay off tlie BOC debt and they used 
the remaining $26,000 to consolidate 
other debts (vehicle loans). At or near 
the closing on tlie Wells Fargo loan, 
Gregory signed a quitclaim deed 
conveying the property to "Gregory P. 
Barrett and Ann Barrett, Husband and 
Wife." 
The parties stipulated that $67,00( 
is the fair market value of this 
property. (They attribute $52,000 to 
the doublewide home and $1 5,000 to 
the lot.) They also stipulated that the 
court should award the property to 
Gregory. They agree that if the court 
decides that the property has remained 
Gregory's separate property, tl~en the 
coln~nunity is entitled to a 
reimbursement claim equal to 77.6% 
of the propeily's value. 
Ann is not necessarily claiming 
FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS ON PROPERTY, DEBT & FEES 
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that this property is community 
property, but she requests that the 
court's ruling on this property to be 
consistent with its ruling on the Etna 
property. 
Following the same reasoning the 
court used in connection with the Etna 
property, the court finds that the 
Contor property is community 
Fargo secured by Gregory would pay this debt; the coun 
property at 278 N. finds it is a corninunity debt. 
I property. 
Contor 
Sale proceeds from 1 8593 1 8593 1 This item represents the net 
Debt owing to Wells 1 
real property at 68 1 
Katie Court3 
(40166) 1 See above. The parties agreed tha 
proceeds from the sale of certain real 
property at 681 Katie Court. Thc 
parties acquired that property during 
marriage and agree that it is 
community property. As explained 
below, however, the parties invested 
some of Gregory's separate property ii 
the Katie Court property. 
Accordingly, Gregory's separate estatr 
is entitled to reimbursement as 
explained below. 
Before his marriage to Ann, 
Gregory owned certain realty the 
parties called the "Tennis Court 
Property." To buy the Tennis Court 
property, Gregory borrowed $96,500 
from Wells Fargo Bank. He made 
monthly payments on that debt, and 
when the parties married, he owed 
$96,147. The parties continued 
making monthly payments during the 
marriage and reduced the debt by an 
"he $1,593 each party received in May 2007 is included it1 the amounts listed. See Plaintiffs Exhibit . . 
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additional $5,230 to $90,917. The 
parties also improved the property 
using community labor and funds; the 
parties stipulated that those 
inlprovetnents enhanced the property'> 
value by $3,000. 
On November 18,2002, Gregory 
sold the Tennis Court property. Ile 
paid off the Wells Fargo debt with the 
proceeds, and he received a net cash 
payment. of $14,526. From that hnd,  
the co~ninunity estate was entitled to 
reimbursement totaling $8,230 
(representing the $5,230 reduction in 
mortgage debt and the $3,000 
enl~ancemellt from the ilnprovements). 
The balance, $6,296, remained 
Gregory's separate property. 
From the sale proceeds, the parties 
spent $ t ,526 on colnlnunity expenses 
not specifically identified in the 
evidence. Accordingly, the 
community portion of the sale 
proceeds was reduced to $6,704. 
The parties invested the remaining 
$13,000-$6,296 of Gregory's 
separate property and $6,704 in 
colnlnunity property-in the real estate 
at 681 Katie Court. 
The parties lived at the Katie 
Courl property for several years. A 
few weeks before the trial in this 
matter, they sold the Katie Court 
property, realizing net proceeds of 
$17,186. 1 
From the net proceeds, the 
colnmunity must pay Gregory's $6,296 
claim for rei~nburselnent o his 
separate estate. 
FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS ON PROPE@T& DEBT & FEES 12 
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on 681 Katie Court 
sale 
(3 148) 
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each took $1,593 froin the communiQ 
proceeds in May 1997. 
During the September 10,2007 
informal conference in chambers, 
counsel agreed that the court should 
place one-half of this fund in the 
control of each party but that such 
allocation would have no impact on 
the parties' positions or arguments on 
appeal. 
See above. 
Real property located 
at 140 N. Adain (lot 
($15000) and double 
wide mobile hoine 
($52,000)) 
Debt owing to 
GMAC secured by 
real property at 140 
N. Adam 
Debt owing to 
Bonneville County 
for property tax on 
140 N. Adain 
Mobile hoine located 
at 181 N. Adam 
Debt owing to 
Bonneville County 
for property taxes on 
18 1 N. Ada111 
Mobile home located 







Ann has been living at this 
residence since October 2005 and 
would like the court to award it to her. 
Gregory does not care whether the 
court awards it to him or to Ann, 
unless an award is needed to 
acco~nplish an equal division of 
property. 
See Plaintiffs Exhibit 26. 
Stipulation 
See Plaintiffs Exhibit 26. 
This property includes only the 
inobile home and not the land on 
which it sits. 
The parties agree that 7113 of the 
value of this property is colnlnunity 
property and 6113 of the value is Ann' 
separate property. 
The parties do not agree on the fa 
inarlcet value of this property. Neithel 
party presented any expert testimony 
to establish the value. 
Froin conflicting evidence, the 
court finds that the fair market value i; 
$8,000. The court notes that this is an 
older singlewide trailer; Ann testified 
that the roof leaks, the trailer is in 
"rough shape," and it is not on a 
foundation. The parties paid only 
$7,000 for the mobile home. 
The parties agreed at trial that the 
court should award this rental propert! 
to Gregory at a value of $7,500. Late1 
however, Gregory testified that shortl: 
before the trial, he incurred a debt of 
about $2,000 to seal the floor and 
replace the carpeting and then re- 
rented the property at a higher rate. 
(The parties stipulated that Gregory 
could provide the bills for the 
carpeting and sealing after trial; he has 
not done so.) Gregory then asked the 
court to characterize the debt as a 
coininunity debt. 
Since Gregory incurred the debt 
during the parties' marriage, the court 
assumes that it was a colnlnunity debt. 
Simplot v. Siinplot, 96 Idaho 239, 526 
P.2d 844 (1974). 
Gregory did not consult Ann 
before sealing and carpeting the floor; 
he made the improvements after the 
parties had agreed the court would 
FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS ON PROPF&;SY, DEBT & FEES 
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award the property to him. 
Accordingly, awarding the property to 
Gregory at a value of $7,500 and 
requiring the comlnunity to pay the 
$2,000 debt would result in a winafall 
to Gregory. Instead, the court has 
valued the property at $9,500 to reflecl 
the i~nprovements Gregory lnade 
before trial. 
See above. Debt owing for 
expenses at 805 N. 
Stevens 
Debt owing to 
Bonneville County 
for property taxes on 
805 N. Stevens 
1998 Toyota Tacoma 
truck 
Children's videos 1 




Based on the parties' stipulation, 
Ann will pick out 6 more videos, and 
Half food storage 
Half food storage 
Set of dining chairs 






Mirror in the 
basement 
Tools (including but 
not limited to 
shovels, rakes, hoes, 
fence pliers, fann 
tools, etc.) 
Baby jungle aniinal 
picture in Shannon's 
Based on the parties' stipulation, il 
75 
appears the parties have already 
divided these items, and Gregory 
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room 
Cat and dog pictures 






1 plant stand from 
Oakridge Furniture 
Dogs on shelf picture 
in Icacey's room 
American shelfidkcor 
by the front door in 
15 
25 




4 stone vases with 
flowers 
1 swivel roclcer 
1 swivel roclcer 
Boxes of sewing 
Stipulation 
170 1 ( Stipulation 
scraps 
Set of dishes (green 
and white) 
pp 
Plant stand in den 
Greenery basket in 
the living room 
under the table 
1 
25 




print coinibrter sheet 
2 silver wire baskets 
in the master 
bathroom 




Mirror, ivy and 













Picture in the 
downstairs bathroom 
Picture at the foot of 
the stairs 
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Stipulation 
Stipulation Unhung picture of 
grapes and fruit with 
1 
25 
2 pictures in the den 
1 Ficus tree 













(Base plan and 
Clioice plan) 
above the mirror in 
the fainily room 
John Wayne nlovies 
Community interest 
in PERSI accounts 
1 1 Based on the parties' stipulation, 
Ann will pick out 6 inore videos, and 
Half 
Camcorder and 
Ann's nail apron 
wit11 haininer & tools 
Half of food: Beans 
& Peas 
Gregory kill send them to her. 
The parties stipulated at trial to 
divide the cominuility interest in these 
accounts equally by QDRO. (The 





- "  
$50 camcorder; $75 apron, 
haininer & tools 
Half of food: Beans 
& Peas appears the parties have already 
1 
Sheets & Coinforters 
to inatch Pillowcase 
from Shane's rooin 
5 horses (Tony, Fire 
Heart, Winchester 
and 2 unnamed) 
Mirror in family 
room 
Half of church 
related books 
acquired during the 
marriage 
Half of cllurch 
related books 
acquired during the 
marriage 
1998 Toyota Sienna 
Van 
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honey 
Half of buckets of 
honey 






Half of income tax 
refund 
Property identified in 






Debt owing to Bank 
of Commerce (Ready 
Reserve) 
Debt owing to Juab 
County Ambulance 










i~lornlal conference in chambers, 
counsel agreed Ann's equalization 
payment would not be due until any 
appeal from the trial court's decision 
Stipulation 
Based on the parties' stipulation, 
the parties svill evenly divide their 
2006 income tax refunds ($5,241 
federal and $746 state). See 
2585 
See Defendant's Exhibit N. Property identified in 







See Plaintiffs Exhibit 26. 
See Plaintiffs Exhibit 26. 
See Plaintiffs Exhibit 26. 
$94292 
(3988) 
payment from Ann 
to Gregory 
FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS ON PROP Y, DEBT & FEES 
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2993 
I was final. 
Defendant's Exhibit N. 
See above. 




During the September 10,2007 
Total $90304 / $90303 1 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW ON ATTORNEYS F E E S  
7. Ann parties asked for an award of attorneys fees under Idaho Code 5 32- 
704. Idaho Code 5 32-704(3) states: 
The court ]nay from time to time after considering thefinancial 
resources of both parties and the factors set forth in section 32-705, Idaho 
Code, order a party to pay a reasonable alnount for the cost to the other 
party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this act and for 
attorney's fees, including sulns for legal services rendered and costs 
incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding or after entry of 
judgment. The court ]nay order that the amount be paid directly to the 
attorney, who may enforce the order in his name. 
Idaho Code 5 32-705 states, in relevant part: 
The . . . order shall be in such amounts . . . that the court deems just, 
after considering all relevant factors which may include: 
(a) The financial resources of the spouse seeking [the 
order], iilcluding the nlarital property apportioned to said 
spouse, and said spouse's ability to lneet his or her needs 
independently; 
(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education and 
training to enable the spouse seeking [the order] to find 
employment; 
(c) The duration of the marriage; 
(d) The age and the physical and emotional condition of 
the spouse seeking [the order]; 
(e) The ability of the spouse [against whoin the order] is 
sought to meet his or her needs while meeting those of the 
spouse [seeking the order]; 
(f) The tax consequences to each spouse; 
FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS ON PROPERTY, DEBT & FEES 
4 t-, 4 
.LC4 
(g) The fault of either party. 
8. The court considers these factors as follows: 
(a) The financial resources of the spouse seeking the order: 
(I) The property allocated to Ann includes alinost $33,000 cash 
(including the proceeds froin the Wyoming 100 sale, the Katie Court sale 
and the tax refund). She also has very substantial equity in the Etna 
property and other real estate. 
(2) Ann estimates that her minilnuin annual living expenses will 
be about $40,392. (See Defendant's Exhibit Q.) Ann could earn about 
$20,000 per year at Melalucca. Her other annual resources include $9,300 
child support Eroln Kevin Spencer, $10,848 child support from Gregory, 
and $1,704 in net rentals. 
(3) Except for the $1,847 debt owing to Interinountain Health 
Care, Ann's only significant debts are related to her real estate holdings. 
(b) The tinze necessar*y to acquire sufficient education and training: 
The evidence did not address this factor. 
(c) The duration ofthe marriage: 
The parties were inarried for almost ten years. 
(d) The age and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse 
seeking [the order]: 
FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS ON PROPERTY, DEBT & FEES 
* !) C) 
I ,,. 
Ann suffered somewhat with depression, does not now suffer any 
physical or emotional ailtnents that would affect her ability to pay fees. 
(e) The ability of the spouse [against whom ihe order] is sought to meet 
his or her needs while meeting those of the spouse [seeking the order]: 
The evidence did not establish Gregory's minilnuin annual expenses. 
Gregory will earn $49,812 as a teacher during the 2007-2008 scl~ool year. 
He may also earn additional income as a carpenter-builder. 
Cfl The tax consequences to each spouse: 
The evidence did not suggest any tax consequences related to a fee 
award. 
(g;) The fault of either party: 
The court: granted a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
9. Considering all these facts, it is clear that each party has the ability to pay 
his or her own attorneys fees. Accordingly, the court will exercise its discretion to order 
that each party bear his or her own fees and costs. 
Dated 9 " \  . 
FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS ON PROPERTY, DEBT & FEES 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the day of September 2007, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing docu~nent on the persons listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon, by facsimile, or by causing the same to be hand delivered. 
/I 
Deputy Court Clerli 
Aaron J. Woolf 
P.O. Box 50160 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
FAX (208) 524-5451 
Royce B. Lee 
770 South Woodruff Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
FAX (208) 524-2051 
-- 
A Courthouse Box US Mail 
FAX G Hand Delivery 
d ~ o u r t h o u s e  Box U US Mail 
FAX Hand Delivery 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY 
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT, ) 
1 Case No. CV-05-4852 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON 
VS. 1 ALL REMAINING ISSUES 
) (PROPERTY AND DEBT 




Based on the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusioi~s of Law entered August 30, 
2007 and entered this day, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The court coilfirlns that the following property is the sole and separate 
property of the plaintiff (Gregory): 
JUDGMENT AND OKDER ON ALL RE&MdpING ISSUES 
.L u , 
Greg's recliner 
Church related boolts Gregory owned before marriage 
Stipulation (Defendant's Exhibit M) 
I contribution to purchase of 681 Katie Court 
2. The court confirins that the following properly is the sole and separate 
property of the defendant (Ann): 
Four horses (Stonny, Cherokee, Misty, Shadow, Tiger) 
- 
Trainpoline 
Extra Iong log chain 
Movies: Air Bud, Beethoven I & 11, Lion King I & I1 
Church related books Ann owned before marriage 
Property identified as Ann's separate property in the parties' written 
Stipulation (Defendant's Exhibit M) 
6113 interest in mobile home located in Thayne, WY 
Bandsaw 
3. The court divides the parties' community propedy and the parties' 
responsibility for paying the coininunity debts as follows: 
I 
- - .  
/in common with /in coilnnon with 1 
Description To Ann / To Gregory 
Real property in Etna, Wyoming /One-half (as tenant lone-half (as tenant 
$22,88 1 debt owing to Bank of Star Valley 
Proceeds from Wyoming 100 sale in the trust 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES 
$ 0 c+ 
.e v I) 
account of ~ o o l f ,  Combo & Thompson 
Real property at 278 Contor (lot ($15000) and 
double wide rnobiie home ($52000)) 









JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES 
' 04 
I u d 
I 
I 
278 N. Contor 
Sale proceeds from real property at 68 1 Katie 
Court 
Debt owing to Gregory's separate estate for 
reiinburseinent claim on 681 Katie Court sale 
Real property located at 140 N. Adam (lot 
($15000) and double wide inobile home ($52,000)) 
Debt owing to GMAC secured by real property at 
140 N. Adain 
Debt owing to Bonneville County for property tax 
on 140 N. Adam 
Mobile home located at 18 1 N. Adam 
Debt owing to Bonneville County for property 
taxes oil 18 1 N. Adan 
Mobile home located in Thayne, Wyon~ii~g 
Real property at 805 N. Stevens 
Debt owing for expenses at 805 N. Stevens 
Debt owing to Bonneville County for property 
taxes on 805 N. Stevens 
1998 Toyota Tacoina truck 
Children's videos (Ann will pick out 6 more 
videos, and Gregory will send them to her.) 
Half food storage 
Half food storage 
Set of dining chairs 
Silver inirror in inaster bedrooin 
Mirror in the basement 
Tools (including but not limited to shovels, rakes, 
hoes, fence pliers, farin tools, etc.) 
Baby jungle animal picture in Shannon's rooin 
Cat and dog pictures in Brittana's rooin 
1 plant stand froin Oakridge furniture 
1 plant stand froin Oakridge furniture 
Dogs on shelf picture in Kacey's rooin 































4 stone vases with flowers 170 1 
bedroom 
Unhung picture of grapes and fruit with a gold 1 )  
1 swivel roclter 1 
1 swivel rocker 1 
fiame 
Picture in the downstairs bathrooin 
Picture at the foot of the stairs 
2 pictures in the den 
1 Ficus tree 
1 Ficus tree 
room 
John Wayne movies (Ann will pick out 6 more 
videos, and Gregory will send them to her.) 
Cominunity interest in PERSI accounts (Base plan 
and Choice plan) 
Caincorder and Ann's nail apron with hamlner & 





Half of food: Beans & Peas 
Half of food: Beans & Peas 







5 horses (Tony, Fire Heart, Winchester and 2 
unnamed) 
Mirror in family room 












Half of church related books acquired during the 1 
marriage 
30 
1998 Toyota Sienna Van 5125 / 
4. Each party shall bear his or her own fees and costs. 
Dated y - 1 \ , . ~ 7  . 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON ALL REMAINING ISSUES 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the ____ day of September 2007, I seived a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by mailing, wit1 the correct 
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Deputy Court Clerlc 
Aaron J. Woolf 
P.O. Box 50160 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
FAX (208) 524-545 1 
Royce B. Lee 
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Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
FAX (208) 524-205 1 
0 Courthouse Box Ci US Mail 
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AARON J. WOOLF 
ldaho State Bar #5791 
THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF &ANDERSON, PLLC 
501 Park Avenue 
P.O. Box 50160 
ldaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 525-8792 
Fax (208) 525-5266 
Attorney for DefendantlAppellant, Ann Barrett. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT, ) 




ANN MARIE BARRETT, ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1 
DefendantlAppellant. ) 
COMES NOW, DefendantlAppelIant, ANN MARIE BARRETT, by and through 
her attorney of record, Aaron J. Woolf, Esq., of the law firm of THOMPSON SMITH 
WOOLF & ANDERSON, PLLC, and hereby gives notice of her Appeal to the District 
Judges Division of the District Court and hereby submits the following information: 
I This Appeal is taken from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District 
of the State of ldaho in and for the County of Bonneville, Magistrate Division in Case 
No. CV-05-4852, entitled Gregory Paul Barretf vs. Ann Marie Barreft. 
2. This Appeal is taken to the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho. 
3. The date and heading of the decisions from which the Appeal is taken 
are: Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law on Property and Debt Division and 
Attorneys Fees, entered September 11, 2007, and the Judgment and Order on All 
Remaining Issues (Property and Debf Division and Aftorney Fees), entered September 
11, 2007. 
4. This Appeal is taken upon matters of both fact and law. 
5. Appellant requests that a copy of the transcript be prepared for the trial 
which was held on June 18,2007 through June 22,2007. 
6. The testimony and proceedings of the original trial held on June 18, 2007 
through June 22, 2007, were recorded by tape recording which is in the custody of the 
Clerk of the District, Magistrate Division, Bonneville County. 
7. The issues on Appeal are. 
a. Did the Court err by finding that the deed signed by Ann Barrett 
transmuted her Etna, Wyoming real estate from separate property 
to community property? 
b. Did the Court err by finding that the proceeds from the sale of the 
Wyoming 100, LLC sale are community property? 
8. Plaintiff reserves the right to submit additional issues on appeal as 
allowed by IRCP Rule 83(f)(6). 
Notice of Appeal Pg. 2 
DATED this L?!? day of September, 2007. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a licensed attorney in Idaho, with my office in ldaho 
Falls, and that on the day of September, 2007, 1 served a true and correct copy of 
the following-described document on the parties listed below, by mailing or by facsimile, 
with the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be hand delivered 
DOCUMENT SERVED: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
\ 
Royce Lee, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
770 S. Woodruff 
Mailed Hand Delivered ax L2Y 
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AARON J. WOOLF 
ldaho State Bar #5791 
THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF & ANDERSON, PLLC 
3480 Merlin Drive 
P.O. Box 50160 
ldaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 525-8792 
Fax (208) 525-5266 
Attorneys for Defendant, Ann Marie Barrett 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT, ) 
) Case No. CV-05-4852 
PlaintiffIRespondent, ) 
) DEFENDANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
VS. ) 
) 




COMES NOW, DefendantIAppellant, ANN MARIE BARRETT, by and through her 
attorney of record, Aaron J. Woolf, Esq., of the law firm of THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF & 
ANDERSON, PLLC, and hereby submits her Brief on Appeal, as follows: 
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1. The Magistrate Erred by finding that the Quitclaim 
Deed signed by Ann during a refinance transmuted 
her separate property into community property.. ..... 
....................... A. Hoskinson v. Hoskinson controls 
I .  The case law cited by the Magistrate in 
his decision, is distinguishable ............... 
ii. Griffin v. Griffin is instructive ................. 
B. The parol evidence rule should not prohibit 
intent testimony in this matter ......................... 
I. The execution of a Quitclaim Deed 
during a refinancing is entirely different 
than the signing of a formal marital 
settlement agreement or transmutation 
agreement.. ....................................... 
ii. The parol evidence rule is inapplicable 
to the facts before this Court, as the 
Quitclaim Deed executed by Ann is 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a divorce matter between the PlaintiffIRespondent, Gregory Paul 
Barrett (hereinafter, "Greg"), and the DefendanffAppellant, Ann Marie Barrett (hereinafter, 
"Ann"). A trial was held on June 18,2007 through June 22,2007. A Rule 54(b) Decree of 
Divorce was entered on July 3, 2007, which divorced the parties, effective, June 22,2007. 
The grounds for divorce were left to the Court for determination, as provided for in the 
Decree of Divorce. Thereafter, on July 27, 2007, the parties filed a Stipulation Re: 
Grounds for Divorce, in which the parties, through counsel, stipulated that the divorce 
decree would be entered on irreconcilable difference grounds. On August 30, 2007, the 
Honorable Earl Blower entered his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Grounds 
for Divorce, Child Custody and Child Support and his Order on Grounds for Divorce, Child 
Custody and Child Support. The only relevant part of this decision and Order, for purposes 
of the present appeal, is that it formally entered the divorce grounds, as irreconcilable 
differences. On September 7 1, 2007, the Honorable Earl Blower entered his Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law on Property and Debt Division and Attorneys Fees, along with 
his Judgment and Order on All Remaining Issues (property and debt division and attorneys 
fees). Ann filed her Notice of Appeal on September 14, 2007. The appeal brought by 
Ann was in regard to the Magistrate's September 11, 2007 Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order. There were numerous Orders entered by 
the Magistrate after the Notice of Appeal was filed, but none of said Orders are relevant to 
the pending appeal. 
This appeal surrounds rulings made by the Magistrate regarding certain real 
Plaintiff's Initial Brief on Appeal -5- 
property, which was known at trial as the "Etna property". 
11. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Ann and Greg were married on November I ,  1997. Tr., V.l, p. 475, L. 8-10. They 
were divorced, on irreconcilable difference grounds, effective June 22, 2007. 
The issues presented on this appeal pertain to real property located in Etna, 
Wyoming (hereinafter, "Etna property"). Tr., V.1, p. 377, L. 20-23. The property is located 
just inside the Wyoming border. Tr., V.1, p. 378, L. 2-3. At trial, Ann testified that the Etna 
property was her separate property. Tr., V.1, p. 378, L. 11-13. Ann acquired the Etna 
property with her first husband, Kevin Spencer, when they purchased the land during their 
marriage. Tr., V.1, p. 378, L. 17-21. Ann and Kevin Spencer, received a deed to the 
property. Tr., V.1, p. 378, L. 22-24; and Plaintiff's exhibit 18 (Warranty Deed Ann and Kevin 
Spencer received when they acquired the property) Tr., V.1, p. 213, L. 12. Ann and Kevin 
Spencer were divorced on April 24, 1996. Tr., V.1, p. 378, L. 25; p. 379, L. 1-6. Plaintiff's 
exhibit 19 is the Decree of Divorce which was entered between Ann and her former 
husband, Kevin Spencer. Tr., V.1, p. 213, L. 12. In said Decree of Divorce, Ann was 
awarded the Etna property. Tr., V.1, p. 379, L. 7-10. At the time of Ann's divorce to Kevin 
Spencer, the Etna property consisted of approximately fifteen acres, a marital residence, a 
mobile home, a hay shed, and a storage shed, located thereon. Tr., V.1, p. 383, L. 13-16; 
Plaintiff's exhibit 19; Tr., V.1, p. 382, L. 15-22. After the Decree was entered, Kevin 
Spencer signed two quitclaim deeds, whereby giving Ann the sole interest in the Etna 
property. Tr., V.1, p. 379, L. 11-14; Plaintiff's exhibit 20; and Tr., V.1, p. 214, L. 13. The first 
Quitclaim Deed was signed on March 31, 1997, and the second Quitclaim Deed was 
signed on April 28, 1998. Plaintiff's exhibit 20. The reason for the two quitclaim deeds was 
Plaintiff's Initial Brief on Appeal -6- 
due to the fact that the first quitclaim deed contained an incorrect legal description. Tr., V.1, 
p. 379, L. 15-20. 
Ann and Greg became married on November 1, 1997. Tr., V.1, p. 475, L. 8-10. In 
August of 1999, Ann sold part of the Etna property to Eric and Dawn Loveland. Tr., V.1, p. 
383, L. 21-25; p. 384, L. 1-3. Specifically, Ann sold to the Loveland's two and one-half 
acres, including her marital residence, for $88,500.00. Tr., V.1, p. 384, L. 10-20. Ann 
transferred the acreage and the home through a Warranty Dee signed on August 12, 1999, 
by she and Greg. Tr., V.1, p. 385, L. 5-22; Defendant's exhibit B (Warranty Deed); and Tr., 
V.1, p. 385, L. 22. 
At the time of Ann's divorce to Kevin Spencer, there was a debt due and owing on 
the Etna property, to Countrywide, in the approximate amount of $126,000.00. Plaintiff's 
exhibit 19 and 21; Tr., V.1, P. 386, L. 2-15. When Ann sold the two and one-half acres to 
the Loveland's, Countrywide was owed $122,355.54. Plaintiff's exhibit 22. Thus, when 
Ann sold the acreage and home to the Loveland's for $88,500.00, there was still a 
remaining balance owed to Countrywide in the approximate amount of $34,000.00, even 
after the proceeds from the sale were applied to the Countrywide debt. Tr., V.1, p. 386, L. 
8-20; Plaintiff's exhibit 22 (Settlement Statement for the sale of the property to the 
Lovelands). Ann was required to pay off the Countrywide loan during the closing of the 
sale of the acreage and home to the Loveland's. Tr., V.1, p. 386, L. 8-20; Plaintiff's exhibit 
22. In order to do so, Ann acquired a loan through the Bank of Star Valley, in the amount 
of $35,881.55, to pay off the remaining balance on the Countrywide loan. Tr., V.1, p. 386, 
L. 16-20; Plaintiff's exhibit 24 (Promissory Note for the loan at the Bank of Star Valley). 
Defendant's Brief on Appeal Pg. 7 
Countrywide was paid in full. Defendant's exhibit D (check to Countrywide). 
The closing for the sale of the acreage and home to the Lovelands and the new loan 
through the Bank of StarValley took place in one day, on August 12, 1999. Tr., V.1, p. 388, 
L. 9-18. The closing took place at the Bank of Star Valley in Afton, Wyoming. Tr. V.1, p. 
388, L. 19-20. During the closing, Ann, Greg, and a representative from the title company 
were present. Tr., V.1, p. 388, L. 23-25. Ann and Greg signed dozens of documents. Tr., 
V.I., p. 389, L. 9-17. Ann did not read each of the documents, and she did not believe that 
Greg did either, as the documents were presented to the parties too fast. Tr., V.1, p. 389, 
L. 18-25. Greg admitted that he did not read all of the documents presented at closing. 
Tr., V.1, p. 71 8, L. 17-1 9. The closing lasted for 20 to 30 minutes. Tr., V.1, p. 390, L. 2-3. 
During the closing, Ann signed a Quitclaim Deed, which indicated that shewas transferring 
the Etna property to she and Greg, as Tenants by the Entireties. Plaintiff's exhibit 23. Ann 
did not recall anything specifically said to she and Greg at the closing, and she did not 
recall signing the Quitclaim Deed, which was admitted as Plaintiff's exhibit 23. Tr., V.1, p. 
390, L. 4-23. In fact, Ann did not specifically recall signing any of the documents that were 
signed at closing. Tr., V.1, p. 390, L. 24-25; p. 391, L. I .  
Ann admits that she signed the Quitclaim Deed which was admitted as exhibit 23, 
but she said that she signed it because it was among several documents that she was 
required to sign. Tr., V.1, p. 391, L. 2-6. Ann did not recall the closing agent giving her any 
explanation of the meaning of the Quitclaim Deed. Tr., V.1, p. 391, L. 7-9. Ann testified 
that if she had been told that the Quitclaim Deed was effectively giving Greg a one-half 
~nterest in the Etna property, she would not have signed it. Tr., V.1, p. 391, L. 10-20. Ann, 
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by signing the Quitclaim Deed, did not intend to give Greg a one-half interest in the Etna 
property. Tr., V.1, p. 391, L. 21-24. 
Prior to signing the documents at closing, Ann and Greg never discussed that Ann 
was giving Greg an interest in the Etna property. Tr., V.1, p. 392, L. 4-1 1; Tr., V.1, p. 718, L. 
20-25. After closing, Ann and Greg did not discuss the fact that Ann had potentially given 
Greg a one-half interest in the Etna property. Tr., V.1, p. 392, L. 12-18; Tr., V.1, p. 718, L. 
20-25. The first time Greg brought up the fact that he may have an interest in the Etna 
property, was after this Divorce action was filed. Tr., V.1, p. 392, L. 19-25; p. 393; L. 1-6; 
Tr.,V.I,p.719,L.21-25;p.720,L. I-5;Tr.,V.I,p.695,L.9-12. 
During marriage, Greg did not take much of an interest in the Etna property. Tr., V.1, 
p. 393, L. 10-1 1 and 23-25. From the date of marriage until the closing date in August, 
1999, Ann paid the mortgage payment to Countrywide and the homeowner's insurance, all 
from her separate checking account. Tr., V.1, p. 394, L. 8-25; p. 395; p. 396, L. 1-23. The 
monies she used to pay these expenses were from her child support from her previous 
marriage, the rental income she was receiving from her separate property, and from a 
small allowance given to her by Greg. Tr., V.1, p. 394, L. 8-25; p. 395; p. 396, L. 1-23. Ann 
continued to make the mortgage payment on the Etna property, from her separate bank 
account, from the date of closing until the winter of 2003. Tr., V.1, p. 396, L. 24-25; p. 397, 
L. 1-23. Thereafter, the parties had a joint account, but Ann continued to make the 
mortgage payment to the Bank of Star Valley, with the exception of one or two instances 
where Greg made the mortgage payment. Tr., V.1, p. 400, L. 7-11. During the entire 
marriage, Ann always felt that this debt was her obligation, and Greg never offered any 
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help in paying this debt. Tr., V.1, p. 399, L. 17-25; p. 400, L. 1-6. 
In December, 2005, Ann sold approximately 2 acres of the Etna property to 
Wyoming One Hundred, LLC. Tr. V.1, p. 401, L. 14-21. This acreage was part of the 15 
acres Ann owned before marriage. Tr., V.1, p. 413, L. 1-6. In exchange for the sale of the 
approximately 2 acres, Ann received $49,322.19 and she was supposed to have five lots 
developed on her property, along with various other improvements. Tr. V.1, p. 403, L. 1-16; 
Defendant's exhibit G; Tr. V.1, p. 404, L. 12-25; p. 405; p. 406; p. 407, L. 1-20; Plaintiff's 
exhibit 27. None of the improvements that were supposed to be made, had been begun, 
pursuant to the agreement with Wyoming One Hundred, LLC, and the time period within 
which they were to have begun, had long expired. Tr., V.1, p. 405; p. 406; p. 407, L. 1-20. 
The proceeds received from the sale of the approximate 2 acres were placed into Ann's 
attorney's trust account. Tr., V.1, p. 401, L. 22-25; p. 402, L. 1-24; Defendant's exhibit F; 
Plaintiff's exhibit 31. The parties agreed that the sale of the parcel of property to Wyoming 
One Hundred, LLC, would have absolutely no effect on the classification of the proceeds 
(separate property vs. community property) from the sale of said property, nor the 
remaining parcel of the Etna property which was not being sold. Defendant's exhibit F. 
Ann and Greg, through counsel, agreed that some of the funds held in Ann's attorney's 
trust account could be used for various expenses incurred by the parties in this divorce 
action. Tr., V.1, p. 412, L. 20-25; p. 413, L. 1-9. The remaining balance in said trust 
account totaled $42,668.24, at the time of trial. Tr., V.1, p. 413, L. 10-23. 
When Ann received the property in her Divorce to Kevin Spencer, the Etna property 
was worth $160,000.00. Tr., V.1, p. 380, L. 7-18; Plaintiff's exhibit 19. At trial, Ann testified 
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that the Etna property was now worth $350,000.00, and that the increase in value was due 
to natural apprkciation. Tr., V.1, p. 381, L. 2-25; p. 382, L. 1-3. Even Greg's expert 
witness, Tom Ogle, who was hired to appraise the real property, agreed that the Etna 
property was worth $350,000.00, as of September 19,2006, the date of his appraisal. Tr., 
V.1, p. 333, L. 5-6. He also testified that the jump in value, from at least 2002, through the 
date of the appraisal, was due to natural appreciation. Tr., V.1, p. 345, L. 7-24. The only 
changes made to the Etna property during the parties' marriage were upkeep and repairs, 
with no significant improvements. Tr., V.1, p. 382, L. 4-14. A gate was put onto the 
property by Greg, however, the same was minimal, and it was constructed at a minimal 
cost. Tr., V.1, p. 414, L. 22-25; p. 415; p. 416; p. 417; p. 418; p. 419, L. 1; Defendant's 
exhibit H. Ann remarked that the Contract which was admitted as Plaintiffsexhibit 27, and 
which required Wyoming One Hundred, LLC to improve the five lots on Ann's property, has 
no added value to the Etna property, as the Contract is worthless. Tr., V.1, p. 616, L. 5-25; 
p. 617, L. 1-16. Tom Ogle agreed with this, as he opined that it was too speculative to give 
a value to the potential subdivision. Tr., V.1, p. 347, L. 10-25; p. 348. 
At the time of trial, the Etna property consisted of approximately 10 acres, a mobile 
home, a hay shed, a storage shed, and a little corral. Tr., V.1, p. 383, L. 13-16; Tr., V.1, p. 
382, L. 15-22. All of the structures on the Etna property which were located on said 
property at trial, were there when Ann received the property from Kevin Spencer, with the 
exception of the little corral. Tr., V.1, p. 382, L. 20-22. 
The balance of the loan owed to Countrywide as of the date of marriage was 
$123,960.94. Tr., V.1, p. 214, L. 22-25; p. 215, L. 1-21; Plaintiff's exhibit 21. The balance 
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of the loan owed to Countrywide as of the date the loan was paid off, during the closing in 
August, 1999 was $121,819.55. Tr., V.1, p. 214, L. 22-25; p. 215, L. 1-21; Plaintiff'sexhibit 
21. The original balance on the debt owed to the Bank of Star Valley was $35,881.55. 
Plaintiff's exhibit 24. The debt owed to the Bank of Star Valley on or about the date of 
divorce was $23,086.19. Tr. V.1, p. 400, L. 14-25; p. 401, L. 1-13; Defendant's exhibit E. 
In the Court's September 11, 2007 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
Property and Debt Division and Attorneys Fees, the Magistrate found thatthe signing of the 
Quitclaim Deed (Plaintiff's exhibit 23) transmuted the Etna property, which was Ann's 
separate property, into community property. The Magistrate further found that the 
proceeds held in Ann's attorney's trust account were community property, for the same 
reasons the Etna property was found to be community property. From this decision, Ann 
filed her Notice of Appeal on September 14, 2007. 
Ill. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Ann's issue on appeal is as follows: 
1 Did the Magistrate err in finding that the Quitclaim Deed executed by Ann, 
during a refinance, transmuted the Etna property from Ann's separate 
property to community property? 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The characterization of property, will not be upheld if the record demonstrates an 
abuse of discretion by the trial court. Matter of Eliasen's Estate, 105 Idaho 234, 238 
(1 983). The division of community property is subject to the sound discretion of the trial 
court, but the trial court's determination will not be upheld if there has been a clear showing 
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of an abuse of discretion. Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 ldaho 448, 458 (2003). 
The District Court exercises free review over questions of law. Stevens v. 
Stevens, 135 ldaho 224, 227 (2000). 
V. ARGUMENT 
1. The Magistrate erred by finding that the Quitclaim Deed sinned bv Ann during 
a refinance transmuted her separate property into community property. 
The Magistrate found that by Ann's execution of the Quitclaim Deed (Plaintiff's 
exhibit 23), she transmuted her separate property interest into community property. The 
Magistrate thus found that the Etna property and the proceeds in Ann's attorney's trust 
account from the sale of a part of the Etna property to Wyoming One Hundred, LLC, were 
community property. In ruling in this manner, the Magistrate erred. 
The law regarding transmutation in ldaho is well documented. ldaho Code §32-917 
allows spouses to transmute separate property into community property by following 
certain formalities, which include the following: the contract must be in writing, and 
executed and acknowledged or proved in like manner as conveyances of land are required 
to be executed and acknowledged or proved. ldaho Code 332-917 (2007). However, 
when one spouse claims the other spouse intended to transmute property orto make a gift, 
the burden is on the party making the claim to prove the intent in question by clear and 
convincing evidence. Ustick v. Ustick, 104 ldaho 215, 222 (1983). This is a high burden. 
Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 ldaho 448, 459 (2003). 
A. Hoskinson v. Hoskinson controls. 
The ldaho Supreme Court has addressed the very issue pending in this case, in 
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Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 ldaho 448 (2003). In Hoskinson, the ldaho Supreme Court 
upheld the Magistrate's determination that despite a Deed executed by husband, whereby 
he conveyed his separate property interest in real property to himself and his wife, during a 
refinance, the property remained husband's separate property. The facts in Hoskinson are 
strikingly similar to those in the present case, as can be seen by the Supreme Court's 
rendition of the Magistrate's findings: 
In 1998 Reed's home was the subject of two separate 
quitclaim deeds. In one deed Elizabeth conveyed her interest 
in the property to Reed. In the other deed Reed conveyed his 
interest in the same property to himself and Elizabeth, as 
"husband and wife." Both deeds were signed and notarized on 
January 23, 1998. The conveyance from Elizabeth to Reed 
was recorded the same day. The conveyance from Reed to 
himself and Elizabeth was recorded on February 9, 1998. 
Elizabeth claims that the second conveyance transmuted 
Reed's property from separate to community property. 
Here, the parties offered conflicting evidence of the intent 
behind the quitclaim deeds. Elizabeth testified that Reed 
asked her to sign a quitclaim deed to facilitate the financing 
and that she refused to sign until Reed agreed to sign a deed 
conveying the property to her and Reed. Reed denied that 
allegation. He testified he signed the quitclaim deed simply 
because the lender presented it to him during the loan closing, 
that he signed it along with many other papers the lender 
presented to him, and that he had no intent to transmute his 
property into community property. Reed notes that he alone 
signed the promissory note for the new loan. Under these 
circumstances, the court finds that Elizabeth has not proved a 
transmutation by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence 
did not establish that Reed intended to make a gift to the 
community. The evidence did not establish whether the deed 
to Reed and Elizabeth was signed before or after the deed to 
Reed. As noted above. Elizabeth damaged her credibility with 
her lack of candor during her testimony on other issues; 
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therefore, the court is inclined to believe Reed's testimony on 
the issue. 
Hoskinson at 459-60. 
The important facts to note in Hoskinson, are that the husband signed a deed, to his 
separate property, during a refinance, to himself and his wife; husband signed the deed, 
along with other documents presented to him at closing; husband did not intend to 
transmute his separate property into community property; and husband's deed was 
recorded after the deed wife had signed whereby conveying her interest in the property to 
husband. The important legal issue to note in Hoskinson is that parol evidence was 
considered by the Magistrate to determine whether wife had proved a transmutation of 
husband's separate property by clear and convincing evidence. The Magistrate's decision 
was upheld by the Supreme Court, and nothing was said regarding the parol evidence rule. 
The facts in Hoskinson, are nearly identical to those in the present case. Ann 
needed to refinance the Countrywide debt, on her sole and separate property, when she 
I 
sold a portion of her Etna property to the Lovelands During the refinancing, she was 
handed dozens of documents to sign One of the documents she did sign, was a Quitclaim 
I 
Deed which Greg argues, transferred her separate property interest to she and Greg. The 
Quitclaim Deed was recorded. Ann had absolutely no intention of giving Greg any interest 
in her separate property. Ann and Greg did not discuss the possibility that Ann was giving 
I Greg a one-half interest in the Etna property before or after Ann signed the Quitclaim 
Deed in fact, the first time Greg brought up the issue that he had a one-half interest in the 
I Etna property, was after the divorce complaint was filed. ' Greg agreed with all of the 
I 
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aforementioned facts. Greg offered no testimony in support of his claim that Ann's 
separate property was transmuted, other than the Quitclaim Deed. Thus, the facts 
illustrating that there was no transmutation of Ann's separate property, in this case are 
even stronger than those in Hoskinson. 
The Magistrate, in the matter before this Court, erred in failing to consider the facts 
listed above, as he was required to do so, pursuant to the Hoskinson decision. Again, in 
Hoskinson, the Magistrate considered intent testimony regarding the deeds, in order to 
determine whether the wife had proven a transmutation by clear and convincing evidence. 
This was upheld by the Supreme Court. In the case before this Court, the Magistrate 
found that there was no ambiguity in the deed, and that the deed, itself, transmuted the 
Etna property from Ann's separate property to community property. Despite the legal 
doctrine approved of in Hoskinson, the Magistrate failed to consider the facts surrounding 
the execution of the deed and the parties' intent, and instead, only looked to the deed. 
This was an error, in light of Hoskinson. Further, when the facts of this case are reviewed, 
it is abundantly clear that Greg cannot prove, by clear and convincing evidence that a 
transmutation took place. In fact, all of the evidence points in favor of no transmutation 
having taken place. 
This result is also equitable. At trial, Ann and Greg's expert testified that the Etna 
property was now worth $350,000.00. Further, there was $42,668.24 in Ann's attorney's 
trust account. If the Magistrate's decision is upheld, Ann loses approximately $200,000.00, 
of her separate propertyl. The only reason for this loss, would be because she refinanced 
1 It is acknowledged that there would still be a community property interest, even if Ann prevails, but it will 
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a debt on her separate property and signed a document which was required to be signed 
by the Title Company. This is simply not right. Especially in light of the Hoskinson 
decision 
In his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Property and Debt Division and 
Attorneys Fees, the Magistrate attempts to distinguish the present case from Hoskinson, 
but his argument is not persuasive. The Magistrate states as follows: 
In Hoskinson, two deeds were signed on the same day: the 
husband signed one deed purporting to convey the property to 
himself and the wife; the wife signed the second deed 
conveying the property to the husband. The evidence did not 
establish which deed was signed first. 
Those facts were cited to in the Supreme Court case of Hoskinson. However, the 
Magistrate then continues in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Property and 
Debt Division and Attorneys Fees, as follows: 
The deeds contradicted each other. Because the language of 
the deeds was not "plain and unambiguous," the court could 
not "determine the intention of the parties . . . from the deed 
itself." Hall v. Hall, 116 ldaho 483, 484, 777 P. 2d. 255, 256 
(1989). The ambiguity created by the dual deeds, justified the 
court's considering parol evidence of the parties' intent. See 
Hall v. Hall, supra. That parol evidence led the court to find 
that the parties intended no transmutation. 
None of this analysis was cited by the Supreme Court in Hoskinson. Thus, this analysis 
cannot be relied upon in distinguishing Hoskinson from the present case. In Hoskinson, 
be minimal compared to the $400,000.00 community property interest the Magistrate has allowed for. In 
fact, in Ann's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, she argues that the community is 
entitled to an interest in the amount of $8,283.05. This amount was arrived upon by taking into account 
the reduction in principal on the loans, during marriage (see Gapsch v. Gapsch, 76 ldaho 44, 53 (1954)), 
less the reimbursement to Ann from the community for the use of her separate property monies held in 
her attorney's trust account. 
Defendant's Brief on Appeal Pg. 17 
the Supreme Court upheld the Magistrate's consideration of the parties' intent in 
determining whether the wife had proved a transmutation by clear and convincing 
evidence, in the factual scenario whereby a Quitclaim Deed is signed on a spouse's 
separate property, during a refinance. The par01 evidence rule was not even referred to in 
Hoskinson. This is not a situation where a deed is given during a purchase or an attempt 
to transfer property between spouses. Rather, this is an all too common occurrence, 
whereby one spouse is required to sign a Quitclaim Deed granting their separate property 
to husband and wife, during a refinance. The Supreme Court's ruling in Hoskinson is 
equitable and resolves this problem, by requiring a Magistrate to review not only the deed, 
but also, the facts surrounding the entering into of the deed, as well as the parties' intent. 
Even assuming that the analysis presented by the Magistrate in his attempt to 
distinguish Hoskinson can be considered, it is not correct. The fact that there were two 
deeds, does not mean that they were ambiguous, and thus, parol evidence could be 
considered. Both deeds in Hoskinson were executed and recorded. The deed from 
husband to husband and wife was recorded after the deed from wife to husband. This 
scenario, is actually much clearer than the factual scenario in the case at hand. By signing 
two deeds, it is clear that the parties had discussions regarding how the property was to be 
titled. Further, the deed granting the property to both parties was recorded after the deed 
from wife to husband. There is no ambiguity in that factual scenario, and this further 
illustrates that the Magistrate is incorrect in attempting to distinguish the current case from 
Hoskinson. 
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The factual pattern in Hoskinson is identical to that in the present case. Perhaps 
more importantly, once the facts of the present case are considered, as required by the 
legal holding in Hoskinson, it is clear that Greg cannot meet his burden of showing that Ann 
has transmuted her separate property by clear and convincing evidence, and thus, the 
Etna property and the proceeds held in Ann's attorney's trust account, must remain her 
separate property. To hold as the Magistrate did, is error. 
I. The Case Law Cited BY The Maaistrate In His Decision, Is 
Distinquishable. 
In part of the Magistrate's decision, he cites to Hall v. Hall, I I6 ldaho 483 (1989) 
and Bliss v. Bliss, 127 ldaho 170 (1995), for the propositions that generally, a quitclaim 
deed executed with the formalities required by ldaho Code 332-917 is sufficient to meet the 
burden that the spouse intended to transmute their property into community property and 
further, where the language of a deed is plain and unambiguous, the intention of the 
parties must be determined from the deed itself, and parol evidence is not admissible to 
show intent 
In jiaJ, the husband and wife acquired a ranch from husband's grandparent's for 
$60,000.00. jiaJ at 483. At trial, husband's grandmother testified that at the time of the 
sale, the ranch was worth $100,000.00 and that the value above the $60,000.00 purchase 
price was a gift. jiaJ at 484. The deed specifically said "for value received", and thus, the 
testimony provided by husband's grandmother directly contradicted the language of the 
deed. jiaJ at 484. The Supreme Court held that "Where, as here, the consideration 
clause clearly recites that the transfer was made "For Value Received," parol evidence is 
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not admissible to contradict the deed by attempting to show the transfer was in part a "gift" 
rather than "for value". Id, Hall dealt with a factual pattern regarding a purchase and sale 
of real property. Hoskinson and the present case pertaining to a refinancing scenario. 
These are completely two different factual scenarios. During a purchase, it is understood 
that both spouses are acquiring an interest in property when their names are placed on a 
deed. This is not the case during a refinance, where the sole purpose of the transaction is 
usually to obtain a loan and not to alter the title to the property. Further, Hall dealt with a 
husband arguing that despite what the deed said regarding consideration, he should be 
able to present additional evidence regarding an alleged gift. This is not the factual 
scenario in Hoskinson nor the facts before this Court. 
In m, husband granted forty-eight acres to wife, and the deed was recorded. 
Bliss at 174. The deed stated, in pertinent part, "THE GRANTOR, GORDON F. BLISS, a 
married man, . . . for and in consideration of ONE DOLLAR and OTHER GOOD and 
VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, conveys and quit claims to ALTHEA BLISS, a married 
woman, as her separate property, whose address is . . ., the following described real 
estate. . . (italics added, capitalization original)." Id. At trial, the husband testified that he 
signed the deed because he was trying to shelter the property from the IRS. Id. The 
Supreme Court held that husband's statements were not admissible to contradict the 
deed's clear language. Id_ Again, the facts in Bliss are entirely different from the facts in 
Hoskinson and the present case. in a, husband executed a deed to transfer property to 
wife as her sole and separate property. He knew that he was transferring the property, 
even if it was to avoid the IRS. In Hoskinson and the present case, as argued above, the 
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deed was signed during a refinance. Again, there are two entirely separate purposes 
related to the transactions in and Hoskinson. In Bliss, the sole purpose of the 
execution of the deed was to transfer title of the property to wife. Conversely, in 
Hoskinson, and the present case, the purpose of the underlying transaction was to obtain 
f~nancing, and not to transfer title to the property. Ann had no knowledge that she was 
potentially transferring her separate property into community property. Nor did the 
husband in Hoskinson. This scenario is completely different than in Bliss. 
ii. Griffin v. Griffin is instructive. 
Griffin v. Griffin, 102 ldaho 858 (Idaho Ct. App., 1982), is another ldaho case which 
dealt with the issue of transmutation during a refinance scenario. In m, husband 
acquired property before marriage. Griffin at 860. During marriage, husband and wife 
refinanced the property which husband acquired before marriage. u As part of the 
refinancing, husband and wife both signed the loan application, which stated that title to the 
property would vest in the names of both, as joint tenants. Id. Further, both parties, as 
part of the refinancing, executed a note and deed of trust. Title to the property 
husband acquired before marriage, remained in his name. Id_ Wife argued, at trial, in part, 
that husband had transmuted his separate property into community property because of 
the refinancing. u at 861. The Magistrate did not discuss the transmutation issue, but he 
found that husband's property remained separate property, which is to say, that no 
transmutation took place. u The ldaho Court of Appeals affirmed the Magistrate's 
decision, when it held that no transmutation of husband's separate property had occurred. 
Id. at 862. Of important note, is the Court of Appeals reference to the loan application -
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form, which stated that the title would vest in the names of husband and wife, and which 
was signed by both parties. Id- at 861. The Court of Appeals minimized this fact by 
reiterating a portion of the decision of the district court, which stated that "the existence of 
the plaintiff's signature on the deed of trust in all likelihood can be explained away as a 
precautionary measure required by a prudent creditor". Id. 
This case is not directly on point, as there was no Quitclaim Deed signed by 
husband to husband and wife. However, it is instructive in the present case, as it is line 
with Hoskinson. First of all, it is a transmutation case, which revolves around a refinancing 
of husband's separate property during marriage. Second of all, despite the written 
document which was signed by both parties, which purported to illustrate their agreement 
that the property should be titled jointly, in both husband's and wife's name, no 
transmutation was found, as the signing of the document by wife was "a precautionary 
measure required by a prudent creditor". Third, the Court of Appeals, looked to all of the 
evidence surrounding the entering into of the documents, in determining whether the 
Magistrate had erred in finding that no transmutation had taken place. 
In the case before this Court, the Quitclaim Deed was signed by Ann, due to the title 
company's or the lender's request. Ann did not request that she sign a Quitclaim Deed, 
and in fact, she did not even know that she signed the Quitclaim Deed. The reason it was 
signed, was because of a "precautionary measure required by a prudent creditorltitle 
company". There was no other reason, and Greg did not even offer any conflicting 
evidence, regarding the same. Thus, the facts of Griffin are somewhat consistent with the 
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facts of the present case. This is further reason as to why it should be found that the 
Magistrate erred by finding that a transmutation occurred by clear and convincing evidence. 
B. The parol evidence rule should not prohibit intent testimony in this 
matter. 
Even if it is determined that Hoskinson is not controlling on the facts of this case, 
the parol evidence rule should not apply to this case, and thus, the Magistrate should 
consider the facts regarding why Ann signed the Quitclaim Deed in question, along with 
the parties' intent, in determining whether Greg has established a transmutation of 
Ann's separate property, by clear and convincing evidence. 
I. The execution of a Quitclaim Deed during a refinancinn is entirely 
different than the siqninn of a formal marital settlement agreement 
or transmutation aareement. 
ldaho Code s32-917 defines the requirements for a valid marriage settlement 
agreement between spouses. I.C. §32-917 (2007). The requirements of I.C. §32-917 are 
also used to determine whether there has been a valid transmutation agreement. 
Stockdale v. Stockdale, 102 ldaho 870, 873 (Idaho Ct. App., 1982). The ldaho Supreme 
Court in Stevens v. Stevens, 135 ldaho 224,227-28 (2000), defines a marriage settlement 
agreement as a prenuptial agreement or an agreement being made with an eye towards 
separation and/or divorce. Likewise, a transmutation agreement, is an arrangement 
between spouses which changes the character of their property from separate to 
community and vice versa. Stockdale at 872. Both of these documents are formal 
documents entered into by husband and wife. Typically, they are lengthy documents which 
specifically defines the property rights being given to the other spouse orto both spouses. 
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Based upon the formality and completeness of these documents, the clear and convincing 
evidentiary standard is met, once they are entered into. Conversely, the signing of a 
Quitclaim Deed, during a refinance, which purports to transfer one spouse's separate 
property interest to both spouses, as community property, is quite different.2 The 
Quitclaim Deed, is often not read during the closing, and it contains standard, boilerplate 
language, as was the case between Ann and Greg. Thus, in the refinancing scenario, 
there should be more of a requirement than merely complying with I.C. §32-917, in 
determining whether a spouse has proven a transmutation by clear and convincing 
evidence. That additional requirement, is to look to all of the facts surrounding the entering 
into of the Quitclaim Deed during the refinance, and the intent of the parties regarding the 
signing of the Quitclaim Deed during the refinance. To find otherwise, as the Magistrate 
did in this case, merely serves to potentially punish a spouse, who is attempting to 
refinance her separate property, when not only was there no intent to transmute their 
separate property into community property, but rather, they may not even know that they 
signed the Quitclaim Deed. 
ii. The parol evidence rule is inapplicable to the facts before this Court, 
as the Quitclaim Deed executed by Ann is ambinuous. 
The signing of a Quitclaim Deed during a refinance is quite different than the signing 
of a deed to transfer property. When a Quitclaim Deed is signed, merely to transfer 
2 It is acknowledged that a deed signed by one spouse to the other, not during a refinancing situation, is a 
valid transmutation. See &. Further, a deed signed by one spouse, regarding that spouse's separate 
property, to both spouses, not during a refinance, would be a valid transmutation. However, this is much 
different than a deed signed during a refinance. The purpose of the transaction when there is no 
refinance, is to transfer the real property. The purpose during a refinancing may be to only obtain a loan, 
or it may be to obtain a loan and to transfer the property. This is why the holding in Hoskinson is correct, 
because it requires a Court to look at the intent of the parties, in the refinancing situation, to determine 
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property, there can only be one purpose, and that is to transfer the property in question. A 
Quitclaim Deed, signed during a refinance, usually, is signed merely because it is required 
by the title company while a party is refinancing a debt on their separate property, as was 
the case in Hoskinson and this case. Though, it may also be that a Quitclaim Deed is 
signed, during a refinance, to not only obtain a loan, but also to transfer title to the 
property. Thus, the Quitclaim Deed, signed during a refinance, is ambiguous. It is well 
settled that parol evidence may be considered to aid the trial court in determining the intent 
of the drafter of a document if an ambiguity exists. Simons v. Simons, 134 ldaho 824,828 
(2000). Thus, the parol evidence rule should not apply in a situation, as we have here, 
where one spouse owns separate property, and during the refinance, she signs a Quitclaim 
Deed in favor of herself and her husband, as the competing purposes behind the deed in 
this scenario shows that the deed itself, is ambiguous. Parol evidence, should then be 
properly considered, so as to determine the intent of the parties, as to whether the 
Quitclaim Deed was signed just to obtain a new loan, or conversely, to obtain a new loan 
and to transfer property to both spouses, as community property. 
... 
111. If the parol evidence rule is held to applv to the factual scenario of this 
case, it does a great iniustice to the clear and convincing evidence 
standard for gifts and transmutations. 
As stated above, ldaho law is clear that where one spouse claims that the other 
spouse intended to transmute property or to make a gift, the burden is on the party making 
the claim to prove the intent in question by clear and convincing evidence. Ustick v. Ustick, 
104 ldaho 215, 222 (1983). 
whether the party arguing for a transmutation has met their burden by clear and convincing evidence. 
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If the parol evidence rule can be used to prohibit intent testimony in the situation 
before this Court, as ruled by the Magistrate, then the clear and convincing standard is 
essentially eradicated, as the Court would only need to see if a deed was signed, 
regardless of the facts surrounding the execution of the same. It is admitted that this 
exception to the parol evidence rule should be limited to the refinancing situation, as 
illustrated in this case. The reason for this exception is because there is generally no 
intention to transmute a spouse's separate property to community property, during the 
refinance. However, there may be a scenario, whereby the spouse refinancing does intend 
to transmute hislher separate property to community property during a refinance. This 
refinance example differs greatly from the factual situation in Bliss. In m, the Husband 
fully intended to execute the deed and to transfer the real property out of his name. That 
was the entire purpose of the transaction. Conversely, during a refinance, the new loan is 
the main transaction, and the signing of documents, including any deeds presented, if even 
known, is secondary. This is the reason the Court should be allowed to look at all of the 
surrounding circumstances when a deed is signed, whereby purporting to transfer one 
spouse's separate property, into community property, during a refinance. This allows the 
clear and convincing evidence standard, which is required to prove a transmutation, to not 
be swallowed by the parol evidence rule, in the refinancing situation. 
C. Ann Quitclaimed her separate property to Greg to refinance a loan on 
her separate property, and not to presently convey title to her separate 
property. 
In Barmore v. Perrone, 179 P.3d 303 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court recently 
addressed a factual scenario similar to the facts at hand in the present case. In said case, 
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husband signed a quitclaim deed purportedly conveying real property located in ldaho, to 
his wife. at 305. After this deed was signed, wife sought to annul their marriage. Id. 
Wife moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the real property which 
was quitclaimed to her, was hers. Husband argued that the sole purpose of the 
quitclaim deed was to avoid probate, and not unconditionally presently to convey the 
property to Barmore. -- Id. The Magistrate ruled in favor of Wife. The District Court 
reversed the Magistrate Court's decision, and thereafter, the matter was appealed to the 
Supreme Court. u One of the main issues addressed by the Supreme Court was 
whether the parol evidence rule bars admission of evidence of husband's intent. at 307. 
In determining that it does not, the ldaho Supreme Court sated as follows: 
A deed "does not take effect as a deed until delivery 
with intent that it shall operate. The intent with which it is 
delivered is important. This restricts or enlarges the effect of 
the instrument." Bowers v. Cottrell, 15 ldaho 221. 228, 96 P. 
936, 938 (1908) (internal quotations omitted). In addition, 
"[ejven where the grantee is in possession of the deed, though 
that may raise a presumption of delivery, still it may be shown 
by parol evidence that a deed in possession of the grantee 
was not delivered." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The 
"controlling element i n x e  question of delivery" is the intention 
of the grantor and grantee. Id. "The question of delivery is 
one of intention, and the rule is that a delivery is complete 
when there is an intention manifested on the part of the grantor 
to make the instrument his deed." u (internal quotations 
omitted). "[Tjhe real test of the delivery of a deed is this: Did 
the grantor by his acts or words, or both, intend to divest 
himself of title? If so, the deed is delivered. 
140 ldaho 16.21, 89 P.3d 856, 861 (2004) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
"It is beyond controversy that the evidence of delivery 
must come from without the deed. In other words, a deed 
never shows upon its face nor by the terms thereof a delivery, 
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and oarol evidence thereof must necessarilv be admitted when 
the question of delivery arises." Whitnev v. Dewey, 10 ldaho 
63, 655, 80 P. 11 17, 1121 (1905). 
Since delivery of a deed is necessary for the deed's 
validity, any evidence is admissible if it indicates the absence 
of delivery. Therefore, the parol evidence rule does not bar 
admission of evidence used for the purpose of determining 
whether delivery of the relevant deed occurred. 
Id. at 307-08. -
Wife argued that the factual scenario in Barmore v. Perrone, was identical to that in 
the case of &, whereby the ldaho Supreme Court refused to consider evidence 
regarding husband's intent, because doing so would have contradicted the deed's plain 
language. The ldaho Supreme Court in Barmore v. Perrone, distinguished Bliss, by stating 
that "This ruling (in m) was correct because husband was not challenging the validity of 
the deed itself or that he intended to convey the property, i.e., deliver the deed, but instead 
challenged only the purpose for delivering the deed, attempting to contradict the plain 
language of the deed." (parentheses added). Id. at 308. Thereafter, the ldaho Supreme 
Court held that since husband was challenging the delivery of the deed, extrinsic evidence 
should be permitted, and thus, the parol evidence rule would not bar the admission of 
evidence regarding husband's intent in executing the deed. Id. 
In the case at hand, Ann did not intend to convey the Etna property to Greg. 
She testified to the same, when she testified that she did not intend to give Greg a one-half 
interest in the Etna property, and further, if she knew that by signing the deed, she was 
giving him a one-half interest in the property, she would have never signed the deed. Ann 
did not intend to convey (i.e., deliver the deed to) her Etna property. Rather, she was 
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merely attempting to refinance a debt on her separate property. Based upon the same, 
evidence of Ann's intent in executing the Quitclaim Deed at issue is not barred by the par01 
evidence rule, and it should have been considered by the Magistrate in determining 
whether Greg met his burden of proving a transmutation by clear and convincing evidence. 
And once Ann's intent evidence is considered, along with all of the other evidence 
regarding the entering into of the Quitclaim Deed, as argued, above, it becomes 
abundantly clear that Greg cannot meet his burden of proving a transmutation by clear and 
convincing evidence, as he only relies upon the Quitclaim Deed, itself. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Ann requests that this Court reverse the Magistrate's ruling that 
the Etna property and the funds held in Ann's attorney's trust account were transmuted 
into community property. Ann would further request, that this Court find, as a matter of 
law, that there was no transmutation, and thus the Etna property and the funds held in 
Ann's attorney's trust account are her separate property. Ann would also request that 
the issue of the community property interest in Ann's separate property be remanded to 
the Magistrate for determination, based upon the evidence already presented. 
Respectfully submitted this 
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1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Greg Barrett concurs in the statement of the case in Ann Barrett's Brief on 
Appeal. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Greg Barrett submits the following statement of facts to supplement the statement 
of facts in Ann Barrett's Brief on Appeal. 
Both Greg and Ann Barrett jointly participated in negotiating the terms of the 
loan with the Bank of Star Valley which was used to refinance the loan on the Etna, 
Wyoming, property when they sold two and a half acres to Mr. and Mrs. Loveland on 
August 12, 1999. Ann and Greg met together at the Bank of Star Valley with a distant 
cousin of Ann named Rod to apply for and establish the terms of the loan. TR., V.1, P. 
226, L. 16 to P. 228, L. 7. Ann was not working at the time of the Etna loan application 
and had no income other than her child support, rental income from a single wide trailer 
on the Etna property and sharing in the community property income of Greg Barrett 
from his employment. TR., V.1, P. 220, L. 1 to 2; and TR., V.1, P. 394, L. 18 to P. 395, 
L. 18. The Bank of Star Valley loan was given to both Ann and Greg. Tr. V.1, P. 221, L. 
20 to P. 223, L.15; Plaintiff's Exhibit 24. 
Ann and Greg met together with the title company closing agent to close the 
Bank of Star Valley loan on the Etna property. During the closing the title agent went 
over each document separately and explained each document to Ann and Greg. TR., 
V . I , P . ~ ~ ~ , L . ~ ~ O P . ~ ~ O , L . ~ ~ ; T R . , V . I , P . ~ ~ O , L . ~ ~ O ~ ~ ; ~ ~ ~ T R . , V . I I , P . ~ ~ ~ , L .  
j-; :, f, 
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22 to P. 629, L.3. Greg asked questions on the closing documents if he did not 
understand them and the title agent answered all questions asked. TR., V.1, P. 229, L. 
22 to P. 230, L. 4. Although Ann claims no memory now about signing specific 
documents at closing, by her presence she participated in the discussion with Greg and 
the title closing agent and had each document explained to her by the title closing agent 
at the time of closing. She had the opportunity to ask any questions about the 
documents and what they meant if she did not understand them. She heard the 
questions by Greg and the answers given by the closing agent at the time of closing. 
TR., V.1, P. 229, L. 8 to P. 230, L. 15. Ann did not raise any questions or objections at  
the time of closing about any of the documents, including the Quitclaim Deed from Ann 
to Greg and Ann. TR., V.1, P. 230, L. 5 to 8. Ann admitted that she did sign the Etna 
Quitclaim Deed at the closing. Exhibit 23. TR., V.1, P. 390, L. 14 to 17 and TR., V.1, P. 
226, L. 6 to 7. 
Ann knew what she was signing when she signed the Quitclaim Deed. Ann 
admitted that she knew the purpose and effect of a Deed was to transfer title and 
ownership to real property. TR., V.11, P. 629, L. 25 to P. 630, L. 24; TR., V.11, P. 635, L. 
19 to P. 636, L. 9. 
Ann had previous experience in real estate in which she bought, sold and 
transferred property through a Deed. Ann acquired ownership of the Etna property in 
1989 through a Warranty Deed from the seller to Kevin and Ann Spencer. Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 18. TR., V.11, P. 632, L. 13 to 633, L. 4; and TR., V.1, P. 378, L. 17 to 24. Ann 
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received a transfer of ownership for the Etna property through the Decree of Divorce 
dated April 24, 1996. TR., V.1, P. 379, L. 3 to 9; Plaintiff's Exhibit 19. Ann also received 
a transfer of Kevin Spencer's ownership to her pursuant to two Quitclaim Deeds dated 
March 31, 1997, and April 28, 1998, the original having an error in the legal 
description. Plaintiff's Exhibit 20 and TR., V.1, P. 214, L. 1 to 13. Ann knew and 
understood the effect of those two Deeds prior to her signing the Quitclaim Deed to her 
and Greg on the Etna property in August, 1999. TR., V.1, P. 379, L. 11 to P. 380, L. 1 
and TR., V.11, P. 633, L. 5 to 25. Ann and Greg jointly signed on August 12, 1999, a 
Warranty Deed to the Lovelands on the two and a half acres of the Etna property at the 
same time Ann signed the Quitclaim Deed to Greg at the closing of the new loan from 
the Bank of Star Valley on the Etna property. Plaintiff's Exhibit 22 and Defendant's 
ExhibitB;TR.,V.II, P.630,L.5to24;TR.,V.I,P.384,L.2 to 19;andTR.,V.I, P.216, 
L. 6 to 17. Ann admitted that the Quitclaim Deeds from Kevin Spencer to her at Exhibit 
20 were the same as, and accomplished the same thing as, the Quitclaim Deed from 
Ann, to Ann and Greg on the Etna property. Exhibit 23 and TR., V.11, P. 635, L. 10 to 
P. 636, L. 9. 
Ann Barrett raised no objection during the closing of the Etna loan to any 
documents, including the Quitclaim Deed. TR., V.1, P. 230, L. 7 to 8; P. 232, L. 15 to 
17. She made no objection to the Quitclaim Deed after the closing until after the divorce 
was filed. TR., V.11, P. 637, L. 7 to 22. 
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Greg testified that he understood at the time of closing the meaning of the 
Quitclaim Deed from Ann to Greg and Ann which was signed by her at closing and he 
understood and assumed it was a valid transfer of a one-half interest to him. TR., V.1, P. 
230, L. 16 to P. 231, L. 24; and TR., V.11, P. 719, L. 3 to P. 720, L. 9. Greg further 
understood that he was a co-signer on the Etna loan and as a result had legal 
responsibility to pay that loan. TR., V.1, P. 230, L. 16 to P. 231, L. 24. 
At the time of Greg and Ann's marriage they established a budget and assigned 
various bills to each person for payment. Originally they maintained separate bank 
accounts. Each account was commingled with community property funds. Ann's 
account received deposits from her child support, the rental income from the rent for her 
singlewide mobile home on the Etna property, TR., V.1, P. 394, L. 18 to 24 (net rental 
income from separate property is community property) and an amount from Greg's 
community income which was budgeted for Ann to pay bills, TR., V.1, P. 395, L. 4 to 
13. Ann did not maintain a separate property account for payment of the Etna loan 
after marriage and before or after the refinancing in 1999 with the Bank of Star Valley. 
The fair market value of the Etna property at the date of Ann's divorce in April, 
1996, was established by the Decree of Divorce to be $160,000.00. The Decree also 
recited that the mortgage at  that time was $124,000.00 so there was equity of 
$34,000.00. Plaintiff's Exhibit 19. The Etna property value appreciated by the time of 
the divorce of Ann and Greg in 2007. However, according to Tom Ogle, who appraised 
the Etna property, most of that appreciation occurred after 2002 when there was a 
r: ., r.> 
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boom in property values arising from the pressure from high land prices in nearby 
Jackson, Wyoming. TR., V.1, P. 344, L. 15 to P. 345, L. 6. The value of the Etna 
property at the time of the refinancing in August, 1999, was probably not significantly 
more than at the date of divorce in April, 1996, based on the testimony of Tom Ogle 
that the big increase occurred after 2002. Therefore, the one-half of the equity 
transferred to Greg Barrett by the Quitclaim Deed in August, 1999, would have been in 
the range of $17,000.00, (one-half of the $34,000.00 at the prior divorce in 1996), or 
slightly higher but not significantly higher. As consideration for Greg receiving one-half 
of the equity in the Etna property, Greg assumed responsibility for the new loan of 
$35,881.55 and made his separate and community property now liable as a resource 
for payment on such loan. TR., V.1, P. 230, L. 16 to P. 231, L. 24. 
Greg participated in ownership and management of the Etna property after title 
was transferred to him by Ann's Quitclaim Deed. That involvement included general 
upkeep and repairing and maintaining the property fences, TR., V.1, P. 382, L. 4 to 8, 
applying and obtaining a permit to increase the access from a narrow farming access on 
Highway 89 to a wider residential access, TR., V.1, P. 415, L. 10  to P. 416, L. 11; TR., 
V.I,P.338,L. 13 toP .339 ,L .  l l ;TR. ,V. l ,P .346,L.  10 to  15;TR.,V.I ,P.367,L.24 
to 372, L. 12; and Plaintiff's Exhibits 33 and 34. This new access gate was considered as 
adding value to the property by Tom Ogle. TR., V.1, P. 338, L. 6 to 11. 
Greg was primarily responsible for negotiating a better sale price for two acres of 
the Etna property sold to the Wyoming 100, LLC, in 2005 for access to an adjoining 
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development project. Ann was willing to accept the first offer of $10,000.00 (TR. V.1 P. 
242, L. 3 to 6) but Greg recommended making a higher counteroffer. Such negotiations 
resulted in the first offer to purchase going from $10,000.00 to a final agreement of 
$50,000.00 plus the development of five lots for Greg and Ann Barrett with a potential 
net profit of $250,000.00. TR., V.1, P. 234, L. 21  to P. 250, L. 12; and Plaintiff's Exhibit 
28 and 29. The sale resulted in net sale proceeds of $49,322.19 paid to Greg and Ann, 
and placed in Aaron Woolf's trust account during the proceedings by stipulation of the 
parties. 
161. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Ann's issue on appeal is as follows: 
1. Did the Magistrate err in finding that the Quitclaim Deed executed 
by Ann, during a refinance, transmuted the Etna property from 
Ann's separate property to community property? 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court as appellate court should uphold the trial judge's findings of 
fact if supported by substantial and competent evidence. Bliss u. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 
848 P.2d 1081. The characterization of property is subject to the sound discretion of the 
I 
I trial court, and should be upheld in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of 
discretion. Matfer of Eliasen's Estate, 105 Idaho 234, 668 P.2d 110 (1983). 
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V. ARGUMENT 
1. The Magistrate ruled correctly that Ann transmuted her separate -
property into community property bv transferring a Quitclaim Deed 
to herself and Greg Barrett. 
In Defendant's Brief on Appeal Ann argues that there should be a different rule 
when a Husband or Wife refinance separate property and transfer title to both Husband 
and Wife. Alternatively, Ann argues that application of the parol evidence rule violates 
the clear and convincing evidence rule for a transmutation. 
A. Noskinson v .  Noskinson supports Greg Barrett's claim of a 
transmutation from separate property to community property. 
Ann submits the case of Hoskinson v. Hoskinson. 139 Idaho 448.80 P.3d 1049 
@'003), as controlling in the present case. However, the Hoskinson case is 
distinguishable based on the facts of that case and actually supports Greg Barrett's 
position and the trial judge's decision in the present case 
In the Hoskinson case the husband obtained financing which utilized his separate 
property as security. At the time of the financing the wife signed a quitclaim deed to the 
husband, and the husband signed a quitclaim deed to himself and his wife as husband 
and wife. Both deeds were dated January 23, 1998. The wife's deed to husband was 
recorded on the same day and husband's deed to husband and wife was recorded on 
February 9, 1998. There was a conflict in the testimony about the purpose and effect of 
these two conflicting deeds. The wife claimed she had refused to sign a quitclaim deed 
0, - -- 
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to allow the financing to occur unless the husband conveyed a quitclaim deed back to 
her and him. The husband claimed that he had signed a quitclaim deed adding the wife 
only because the lender gave it to them to sign at closing and that the wife had signed 
her quitclaim deed back to him to release her claim to his separate property after the 
financing. He claimed he had no intention to transmute ownership of his separate 
property to community property. It is important to note that only the husband signed 
the promissory note on the new loan and the wife did not become personally obligated 
on the new loan. The trial judge noted that it was unclear which deed had been signed 
first and that the wife had not been truthful in her testimony on other matters. Based 
thereon the trial judge concluded that the wife had not met her burden of proof to show 
a transmutation of the separate property interest of the husband in his real estate to a 
community property interest for husband and wife. The Idaho Supreme Court did not 
rule that a deed from one spouse to the other during refinancing is not a transmutation, 
nor did it suggest a different rule in refinancing cases. The Supreme Court merely held 
there was sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's findings. 
In the Hoskinson case there are important factual differences to consider when 
comparing it to the present case. First, Greg Barrett signed the promissory note and 
deed of trust at the time of the refinancing and became personally obligated on the new 
loan. This obligated his community property and his separate property as a source for 
repayment. In the Hoskinson case a transfer from the husband to the wife would have 
been a gift because the wife did not assume any personal liability and therefore no 
0, ., " 
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consideration was given for the change to a community property interest. Greg assumed 
a significant obligation on the new loan which is adequate and legal consideration for 
receiving a community property interest in the property. Second, in the present case 
there was no quitclaim deed back to Ann Barrett from Greg to create an ambiguity. In 
the Hoskinson case the two conflicting deeds created an ambiguity which allowed parol 
evidence to be considered on the intention of the parties. Third, it is important to note 
that the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial judge as the finder of fact based 
on substantial competent evidence which was not clearly erroneous. Hoskinson at 1061. 
The Supreme Court did not rule whether as a matter of law the transfer from husband 
to wife in Hoskinson was or was not a valid transfer. The Supreme Court merely upheld 
the trial judge's conclusions as  being sufficiently supported by substantial competent 
evidence. Fourth, in the present case there was not a question about Greg testifying 
honestly and correctly as existed in the Hoskinson case. In Hoskinson the trial judge 
adopted husband's testimony because wife had not been truthful in other matters. In 
fact, there was really no conflict between the testimony by both Greg and Ann about the 
circumstances relating to the signing of the new loan documents and the quitclaim deed. 
After determining there was an ambiguity in the transfer documents the trial judge 
in Hoskinson considered parol evidence regarding the intent of the parties. Ann argues 
that the trial judge should have considered parol evidence in the present case even 
though there was no ambiguity in her transfer documents. However, in contrast with the 
Hoskinson facts, in the present case there was no ambiguity from conflicting deeds, 
r -  . r-! 
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there was no alternate deed reversing the other deed and there was no written 
agreement to counter or undo the transfer of the Etna property into Greg's and Ann's 
names. 
interestingly, Judge Blower was the trial judge in both the Hoskinson case and the 
Barrett case, and presumably knew well the facts and his ruling in Hoskinson, as he 
rendered his decision on the facts in the present case. 
i. THE CASE LAW CITED BY THE MAGISTRATE IN HIS DECISION 
SUPPORTS GREG BARRETT'S POSITION. 
Ann argues in Defendant's Brief on Appeal that the case law cited by the trial 
judge in the present case is distinguishable. In the first case cited by the trial judge, !+aJ 
o. Hail, 11 6 Idaho 483. 777 P.2d 555, grandparents had sold property to a grandson 
and his wife. The deed was recorded and the required payment of $60,000.00 was 
made. Later when the grandson and wife were divorcing the grandmother claimed that 
the property was worth $100,000.00 at the time of the transfer and $40,000.00 was 
intended as a gift to the grandson only. The transfer deed said that the property was 
transferred "for value received." Based on these facts the Idaho Supreme Court upheld 
the application of the par01 evidence rule and found that the deed was plain and 
unambiguous so the court must determine the intent from the deed itself. The Court 
stated that the parties were not allowed to contradict a clear deed with oral or written 
statements, and only if the document is ambiguous will evidence of facts and 
surrounding circumstances be admissible. In !+aJ the Supreme Court held that the deed 
6.; '7 $7 
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was clear and unambiguous in its statement that the transfer was "for value received" so 
consideration was given and par01 evidence would not be admissible to support a claim 
that part of the transfer was a gift to the grandson. 
The Supreme Court's decision in the H A  case supports the trial judge's decision 
in the present case. As in m, Ann conveyed title by a clear and unambiguous 
Quitclaim Deed to herself and Greg as tenants by the entirety1. Because there was no 
ambiguity in the deed, the deed controls, and additional evidence about the parties' 
intent from the facts and circumstances cannot be considered. 
The second case relied upon by the trial judge in the present case was Bliss v. 
Bliss. 127 Idaho 170,898 P.2d 1081. In that case the husband had signed a deed to his 
wife on forty-eight acres of real property and the deed was recorded. At the divorce trial 
husband argued that he had signed the deed in order to avoid an IRS lien against him 
on the forty-eight acres. The wife gave conflicting testimony as to the parties' intent 
regarding the deed. The husband argued the deed was void for lack of consideration 
and that he had not intended to actually convey his interest in the community property 
to his wife as separate property. The Idaho Supreme Court noted that the deed was in 
writing, signed by the grantor, and included the name and address of the grantee, so it 
constituted a valid conveyance of legal title to real property according to Idaho Code 
955-601. Id. at 174. The Court then noted the presumption from Idaho Code 932- 
l ~ e n a n c ~  by the entirety is recognized in Wyoming where the Etna property is located and the closing occurred. 
Wyoming statutes, 534-1-140. For purposes of this case both parties have treated the community property laws of 
Idaho as consistent with a Tenancy by the entirely. 
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906(2) that "property conveyed to one spouse by the other shall be presumed to be the 
sole and separate estate of the grantee". Id. at 174. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the husband's statements to show his intent or that 
there was no consideration were inadmissible under the parol evidence rule since the 
deed was plain and unambiguous. 
However, Gordon's statements regarding intent and consideration were 
inadmissible to contradict the deed's clear language. In Hull o. Hull we 
reiterated that where a deed is plain and unambiguous, the intention of 
the parties must be determined from the deed itself. "Oral and written 
statements are generally inadmissible to contradict or vary unambiguous 
terms contained in a deed." Id. Here, not only did Gordon "convey" the 
property to Althea, thereby raising the presumption of separateness under 
I.C. 532-906(2), the deed expressly states the land is conveyed "as her 
separate property." Further, the deed unambiguously declares that it is "in 
consideration of ONE DOLLAR and OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE 
CONSIDERATION." Gordon's extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to 
contradict these clear statements. Thus, the evidence offered to rebut the 
statutory presumption of I.C. 532-906(2) was legally insufficient. (Citations 
omitted). Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 174-5. 
The Supreme Court further explained the policy considerations underlying the 
parol evidence rule as well as the statute of frauds. 
As we understand the statute [of frauds] above quoted, it was intended to 
prevent just such a class of proof and to preclude the possibility of titles 
becoming subject to the capricious memories of interested witnesses. The 
statute was enacted to guard against the frailties of human memory and 
the temptations to litigants and their friendly witnesses to testify to facts 
and circumstances which never happened. Experience had convinced 
both jurists and lawmakers that the only safe way to preserve and pass title 
to real property is by a written conveyance subscribed by the grantor. The 
beneficial effects of this statute would be destroyed if a grantor could come 
in years afterwards and submit oral testimony to show that the conveyance 
was not intended as an absolute grant but was only intended to create a 
trusteeship in the grantee. Id. at 175. 
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The applicable facts in are identical to the facts in the present case. Ann 
conveyed by Quitclaim Deed an interest in real property to herself and Greg. The Deed 
is clear and unambiguous. The deed was in writing, signed by the grantor and included 
the name and address of the grantee as required by I.C. $55-601. The same 
presumption in I.C. $32-906(2) applies in the present case to show that Greg received a 
separate one-half interest in the community property. Ann's "extrinsic evidence" is 
inadmissible to contradict these "clear statements". Ann's "evidence offered to rebut the 
statutory presumption of I.C. s32-906(2) was legally insufficient." The Idaho Supreme 
Court's explanation of the policies and considerations underlying this rule are also 
applicable in the present case. The beneficial effects of the statute of frauds which 
requires transfers to be in writing would be destroyed if the grantor, in this case Ann, 
"could come in years afterwards and submit oral testimony to show that a conveyance 
was not intended." Certainty in real estate transactions has been historically determined 
to require compliance with the formalities required by statute in the State of Idaho. 
Therefore, Ann should not be permitted to violate the statute of frauds and introduce 
extrinsic evidence years later in opposition to her signed deed to Greg Barrett. 
The same principles in Hall v. Hall and Bliss v .  Bliss, apply in this case. Ann's 
deed to Ann and Greg is clear and unambiguous. On its face it conveys a one-half 
undivided interest in the Etna property to Greg. Therefore, the presumption of Idaho 
Code S32-906(2) applies in favor of Greg. Ann has the burden to go forward with other 
evidence to overcome that presumption. She gave no admissible evidence to counter 
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the presumption. Therefore, the deed should be enforced as a valid transfer to Greg 
Barrett. 
ii. THE TRANSFER OF A QUITCLAIM DEED FROM ANN TO GREG 
COMPLIED WITH ALL STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY AND TRANSFERS BETWEEN 
SPOUSES. 
The requirements for a valid conveyance of real property are noted in Idaho 
Code $9-503 and 9-505, which are statutory declarations of the common law rule based 
on the statute of frauds, as follows: 
9-503. Transfers of  real property to be in writing. - No estate or 
interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not exceeding one 
(1) year, nor any trust or power over or concerning it, or in any manner 
relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or 
declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a conveyance or other 
instrument in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized by writing. 
9-505. Certain agreements to be in writing -In the following cases 
the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or memorandum 
thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent. 
Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the 
writing or secondary evidence of its contents:. . .4. An agreement for.. . the 
sale of real property, or of an interest therein.. . . 
Ann Barrett satisfied these requirements by signing a written Quitclaim Deed to 
Greg. 
A similar requirement is found at Idaho Code s55-601 which requires that the 
conveyance of real property must be in writing and signed to be valid. 
r, 1) 
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55-601. Conveyance - Mow made. -A conveyance of an estate in real 
property may be made by an instrument in writing, subscribed by the 
party disposing of the same.. ..The name of the grantee and his complete 
mailing address must appear on such instrument. 
As noted in I.C. §55-604 the effect of a written conveyance of real property is that 
it is presumed that the Grantor intended to grant a fee simple title unless a lesser grant is 
noted in the transfer document. 
55-604. Fee presumed to pass. - A fee simple title is presumed to be 
intended to pass by a grant of real property unless it appears from the 
grant that a lesser estate was intended. 
As noted in I.C. s55-606 the validity of such a grant is declared to be conclusive 
against the Grantor except for a bona fide purchaser who has previously recorded a 
transfer on the property. 
55-606. Conclusiveness of conveyance - Bona fide purchasers. - 
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is conclusive 
against the grantor, also against every one subsequently claiming under 
him, except a purchaser or encumbrancer, who in good faith, and for a 
valuable consideration, acquires a title or lien by an instrument or valid 
judgment lien that is first duly recorded. 
These sections make the transfer conclusive against Ann because there was no 
restriction or limitation in the deed and there was no other written agreement to the 
contrary between Ann and Greg. This section operates as more than a presumption and 
binds Ann conclusively to the deed which she transferred to Greg, 
Other requirements are provided by statute in situations involving husbands and 
wives. Idaho Code §32-906(2) provides that property conveyed by one spouse to the 
other is presumed to be the sole and separate property of the receiving spouse. 
r. 4 *J 
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32-906. Community property - Income from separate and 
community proper ty.... - (2) Property conveyed by one spouse to the 
other shall be presumed to be the sole and separate estate of the grantee 
and only the grantor spouse need execute and acknowledge the deed.. . . 
Additional rules are established by statute regarding property rights between 
spouses and by marriage settlement agreements. Idaho Code s32-916 provides that 
property rights between a husband and wife are controlled by provisions in that chapter 
unless there is an enforceable marriage settlement agreement to the contraly. 
32-916. Property rights governed by chapter. The property rights of 
husband and wife are governed by this chapter, unless there is a marriage 
settlement agreement entered into during marriage containing stipulations 
contrary thereto. 
The requirements for an enforceable marriage settlement agreement is provided 
at Idaho Code s32-917 as follows: 
32-917. Formalities required of marriage settlements. All contracts 
for marriage settlement agreements must be in writing, and executed and 
acknowledged or approved in like manner as conveyances of land are 
required to be executed and acknowledged or proved. 
In the present case the Quitclaim Deed signed by Ann Barrett to Ann and Greg 
Barrett satisfies the requirements of this section. The transfer was in writing, and was 
executed and acknowledged in the same manner as a conveyance of land, which were 
noted above in Idaho Code s9-503 and 55-601. 
A marriage settlement agreement must be recorded in the county recorder's office 
where the real estate is located which in the present case was done by the closing agent. 
32-918. Marriage settlements - record. (I)  When such contract is 
acknowledged or proved, it must be recorded in the office of the recorder 
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of every county in which any real estate may be situated which is granted 
or affected by such contract.. . . 
The recording of a conveyance of real property is constructive notice to 
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. 
55-811. Record as notice - Every conveyance of real property 
acknowledged or proved, and certified, and recorded as prescribed by law, 
from the time it is filed with the recorder for record, is constructive notice 
of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers and mortgage(e)es. 
A review of these Idaho statutes regarding transfers of real property and 
conveyances between spouses and marriage settlement agreements indicates the 
following conclusions: 
1. Ann satisfied all statutory requirements for a conveyance of real property to Greg. 
I.C. 39-503 and 9-505; 55-601. 
2. It is presumed that Ann conveyed a fee simple title to Greg in his one-half 
interest. I.C. 355-604. 
3. The transfer by Ann to Greg is conclusive against her and binding on any person 
or entity subsequently acquiring an interest in the same property. I.C. 355-606. 
4. The transfer by Ann to Greg of a one-half interest in the property is presumed to 
convey to him a separate interest in the property. I.C. s32-906(2). 
5. The transfer by Ann to Greg satisfied all the formalities of a marriage settlement 
agreement because it was signed by Ann, acknowledged by a notary and recorded in 
the county where the real property is located. I.C. 332-917, 918. 
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6. The loan agreement and the deed by Ann to Greg constitutes a marriage 
settlement agreement between them in which a one-half interest in the property was 
transferred to Greg and he accepted responsibility for payment of the loan. I.C. 932- 
917, 918. 
7. There was no other marriage settlement agreement to the contrary which 
reversed, limited, or restricted the transfer to Greg. I.C. 932-917. 
8. Pursuant to Idaho Code 932-916 there must be a counter marriage settlement 
agreement, or a reverse Quitclaim Deed signed, acknowledged and recorded by Ann 
and Greg in order to reverse or void the transfer to Greg. 
The conclusion from this review of the controlling statutes for the present case is 
that the transfer from Ann to Greg by Quitclaim Deed constitutes a valid and 
enforceable transfer to Greg of a one-half interest in the Etna property. Such transfer is 
"presumed to be valid and is "conclusive" against Ann. 
iii. GREG SATISFIED HIS BURDEN OF PROOF BY CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE DEED TRANSMUTED ANN'S 
SEPARATE PROPERTY TO COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
The original burden of proof to show a transmutation of property during marriage 
is on the person claiming such transmutation and it must be shown by clear and 
convincing evidence. Ustick v. Ustick. 104 ldaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083. When that 
evidence has been presented then the burden of persuasion shifts to the opposing party 
to show sufficient evidence to the contrary. Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho at 174; I.R.E. 301. 
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Greg satisfied his original burden of proof to show by clear and convincing evidence 
that a transmutation occurred based on Ann Barrett signing a clear and unambiguous 
Quitclaim Deed transferring a one-half interest in the Etna property to him. Such Deed 
was required by a lending agency which granted a loan to Ann and Greg for refinancing 
on her previous separate property. The Quitclaim Deed was recorded in the normal 
course of the transaction. Completing these formalities satisfies the statutory 
requirements for deeds and marriage settlement agreements and further creates a 
presumption of validity which Ann must overcome in order to prevail. 
Ann failed to provide any testimony to counter Greg's testimony except her own 
statement that she did not intend to give Greg a one-half interest. She did not present 
any reverse Quitclaim Deed, or a reverse marriage settlement agreement, or admissions 
by Greg, or any other legitimate evidence. Therefore, Ann's failure to meet her burden 
of persuasion means Greg's evidence is controlling and the trial judge's findings of facts 
and conclusions should be upheld. 
B. THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE PROHEISIITS TESTIMONY OF INTENT 
IN THE PRESENT CASE. 
Ann argues in her Brief on Appeal in Section B that even if the Hoskinson case 
does not apply to the facts in the present case the court should still consider par01 
evidence about the intent and circumstances of the transfer by Quitclaim Deed to Greg. 
The claim for such argument is that when spouses are refinancing property it is different 
than a formal marriage settlement agreement or transmutation agreement. This 
c' # ,*, 
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argument is contrary to the provisions of Idaho Code 932-917 which defines what is 
required for a formal marriage settlement agreement. As noted above, that requirement 
is that it must be in writing, and acknowledged and recorded. Ann's argument proposes 
another requirement to Idaho Code 932-917 that it must be lengthy and complex. Such 
is contrary to the statutes of Idaho and would impose an unreasonable burden on 
married parties in their dealings with each other. 
i .  A DEED DURING REFINANCING IS A VALID AND EFFECTIVE 
METHOD TO TRANSMUTE PROPERTY DURING MARRIAGE AND IT 
SATISFIES THE REQUHREMENTS FOR A MARRIAGE SEITLEMENT 
AGREEMENT. 
Ann argues that a Quitclaim Deed used in a refinancing situation should be 
treated differently than a deed in a sale or purchase agreement by spouses. However, 
the Quitclaim Deed to Greg and Ann will be treated the same as any other Quitclaim 
Deed in relation to the rights of the Bank of Star Valley as lender, and for all subsequent 
purchasers of the property, and for title insurance purposes on the property, and for 
creditors of either Ann or Greg who may seek to use the Etna property as a resource for 
payment of a debt, and for governmental tax entities who may seek to enforce payment 
of taxes against the Etna property on behalf of either Ann or Greg. The purpose of the 
recording of the real estate documents is to provide notice to the world of the claims to 
ownership of the property. Ann knowingly signed the Quitclaim Deed and the legal 
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ramifications of signing that Deed are effective as to all other persons and entities and 
must be effective as to Greg and Ann also. 
Ann argues that she did not understand the effect of a Quitclaim Deed and did 
not really intend to convey a one-half interest in the Etna property to Greg by signing 
the Quitclaim Deed. However, failing to read or understand a contract, is not a valid 
defense. A similar argument was made in the recent case of Cristo Viene Pentecostal 
Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 160 P.3d 743. (2007). In that case the agent for the 
Plaintiff Church could not read English and thought he was signing a purchase contract 
for real property. In fact the contract, which was written in English, was only a lease with 
an option to purchase. The option date passed since the Plaintiff Church was not aware 
of the option. The Supreme Court held that failure to read or understand a contract 
when signing it is not an excuse. That is another way of stating the legal maxim that 
"ignorance of the law is not a defense." See TR. V. 11, P. 636, L. 20 to 24. 
i i .  REFINANCING OF SEPARATE PROPERTY BY A SPOUSE IS 
SUBJECT TO THE SAME RULES AS IN OTHER REAL ESTATE 
TRANSACTIONS. 
Ann argues that the law regarding parol evidence should be different in her case 
between spouse's, than it is in other cases of real estate transactions because refinancing 
is inherently ambiguous. Greg argues that the same law should apply in this case as 
applies to other real estate transactions. The case of Bliss u. Bliss, supra, dictates that 
Greg's argument and the trial judge's decision in the present case are correct. Like in the 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON APPEAL -26 
present case, in @l& a spouse signed a deed to the other spouse and later argued he did 
not really intend to transfer the property to the spouse. The Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the grantor spouse was bound by the deed and was not allowed to disclaim intent 
at a later date. In B& one quitclaim deed was sufficient to transmute property to the 
other spouse, without any other written documentation. 
The case of Griffin v. Griffin. 102Idaho 858, 642 P.2d 949 is instructive on when 
a refinance of separate property during marriage will not cause a transmutation. In that 
case husband refinanced his separate property during marriage. The wife signed the 
promissory note and the Deed of Trust for the new loan. However, the husband did not 
sign a deed to wife to place her on the title as part of the refinancing. Based on those 
facts the Court of Appeals held there was no transmutation, noting there was no deed to 
the wife and there could be no oral transmutation. 
In the present case there is a clear and unambiguous deed from Ann to Ann and 
Greg, so the opposite conclusion from Griffin would be reached that there was a 
transmutation during refinancing. Ann is then left to argue that there was some other 
oral agreement that the deed would not really apply. This argument that there was an 
oral transmutation agreement was rejected in Griffin during refinancing by the spouse. 
Ann further argues that if the parol evidence rule applies it would create an 
injustice and the clear and convincing evidence rule of Ustick v. Ustick would be 
eradicated, but only in "refinance cases" between spouses. Another way of stating this 
premise is that if one spouse in a refinancing case feels an agreement was unfair then 
,- I.; f', 
L U  J 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON APPEAL -27 
parol evidence should be allowed so the judge can determine fairness by reviewing the 
intent and surrounding circumstances of an agreement. Such an application would be 
contrary to the Idaho statutes regarding real estate transactions and transfers between 
spouses as noted above. The effect of such an argument would be that Ann should be 
allowed to undo one portion of the transaction that was to her detriment even though 
that part, Greg joining as a responsible party on the loan, was necessary in order to 
accomplish the new financing which was a benefit to Ann. That eliminates the right of 
Greg Barrett to decide whether or not he would sign on the promissory note and 
assume responsibility therefore if he was not going to also be a part owner of the 
property which was being refinanced. Ann should not be allowed to undo a transaction 
which was to her detriment and retain all of the benefits from the same transaction. 
C. ANN'S QUITCLAIM DEED DURING REFINANCING CONVEYED A 
PRESENT TITLE TO GREG. 
Ann argues in Part C of Defendant's Brief on Appeal that the recent case of 
Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 179 P.3d 303  (2008) should allow her to present 
testimony on intent because the deed was never "delivered". In that case the husband 
signed a Quitclaim Deed to his wife on his separate real property. He claimed the 
purpose was to avoid probate if he died, so that the deed could transfer ownership to his 
wife at that time. He claimed there was no intent to deliver the deed and make it 
presently effective rather than at his death. The case was decided at the trial court level 
on a Motion for Summary Judgment. The magistrate had refused to consider an 
r r: 
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Affidavit from the husband reciting the above facts about his intent to avoid probate and 
the lack of delivery of the deed. The Affidavit further stated that the husband and wife 
had previously prepared a similar deed from husband to wife on other property 
husband had owned in California, and this was also done with the intent to be effective 
at his death to avoid probate. The reason given by the magistrate was that the Affidavit 
had been filed late and would not be considered on a Motion for Reconsideration. The 
Idaho Supreme Court held that the magistrate erred in not considering the Affidavit on 
the Motion for Reconsideration. The Supreme Court explained that delivery of the deed 
is necessary for the deed to be valid and therefore the factual issue was properly raised 
by the husband's Affidavit. As a result the summary judgment was incorrect and must be 
reconsidered by the trial court. 
In Barmore v. Perrone, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the husband's 
claim that he did not "intend" the deed to be effective when signed, was the same as 
claiming he did not "deliver" the deed at the time of signing, since the husband claimed 
it was only intended to be "delivered" when he died in order to avoid probate. Ann 
never raised the issue in the five day trial about whether the Quitclaim Deed was 
"delivered to Greg. She only testified that she did not "intend" to give Greg a one-half 
interest in the Etna property. 
In Barmore the deed was never recorded in the county recorder's office. in the 
present case Ann's Quitclaim Deed to Greg was recorded in the county recorder's office. 
The recording of a deed creates a presumption of delivery. Hartlev v. Stibor, 96 Idaho 
r r; r 
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157, 525 P.2d 352 (1974); Hiddleson v. Cahoon, 37 Idaho 142.214 P. 1042 11923); 
Idaho Trust Co., v. Eastman. 43 Idaho 142,249 P. 890 11 926). In Hartlev v. Stibor, the 
ldaho Supreme Court also applied the presumptions in I.C. s55-604 that a fee simple 
title is presumed to be intended to pass in a deed, and in I.C. s55-604 that a deed of 
conveyance is conclusive against the grantor. The Court then reversed the trial court 
which had found the grantor did not intend a delivery of the deed, even though it was 
recorded and in the possession of the grantee. 
In the present case the title company returned the recorded Quitclaim Deed to 
Ann and Greg Barrett and it was in their possession as indicated by the recording 
certification on the deed introduced as Plaintiff's Exhibit 23. Possession of a deed by the 
grantee also creates a presumption of delivery. Hartlev v. Stibor, supra. Since both 
recording and possession of the deed occurred, delivery of the deed is undisputed. Ann 
did not claim at trial that there was no delivery of the deed. Therefore, the argument 
from Barmore u. Perrone does not apply in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Greg requests that this Court uphold the decision of the trial judge, made after a 
five day trial with full opportunity to consider the witnesses' testimony and the trial 
exhibits. This Court should uphold the trial court's decision that Greg met his burden of 
proof of clear and convincing evidence through the plain and unambiguous Quitclaim 
Deed from Ann to Greg and that Ann failed to meet her burden of persuasion that 
somehow the Deed she signed was not valid. 
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COMES NOW, DefendantIAppellant, ANN MARIE BARRETT, by and through her 
attorney of record, Aaron J. Woolf, Esq., of the law firm of THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF & 
ANDERSON, PLLC, and hereby submits her Reply Brief on Appeal, as follows' 
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I .  ARGUMENT 
. The statutory arguments advanced by Greg are not dispositive of the issue 
before this Court. 
Greg argues in section V.1 .A.ii. of Plaintiff's Brief on Appeal, that he should prevail 
as the quitclaim deed from Ann to Greg complied with the statutory requirements for 
conveyances of real property and transfers between spouses. Essentially, Greg makes 
three (3) different statutory arguments. First, he argues that pursuant to ldaho Code s55- 
601, et seq., the quitclaim deed is conclusive against Ann. Second, Greg argues that 
ldaho Code (j32-906(2) applies to this case, and since Ann signed the quitclaim deed, it is 
presumed that she conveyed to Greg a separate property interest in the Etna property. 
And finally, Greg argues that pursuant to ldaho Code s32-916, et seq., Ann's execution of 
the quitclaim deed is a valid marital settlement agreement which transmutted Ann's 
separate property into community property. All of these arguments must fail. 
ldaho Code (j55-606 does state that "a conveyance of an estate in real property is 
conclusive against the grantor". However, this rule, alone, does not answer the question in 
a marital, refinancing, situation. First of ail, as stated previously, in Hoskinson v. 
kioskinson_, 139 ldaho 448 (2003), the ldaho Supreme Court upheld the Magistrate's 
determination that despite a Deed having been executed by husband, whereby he 
conveyed his separate property interest in real property to himself and his wife, during a 
refinance, the property remained husband's separate property. Thus, the facts in 
Hoskinsori, which are nearly identical to the factual situation in this case, creates an 
exception to the general rule outlined in ldaho Code 555-606. Second of all, in cases 
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involving spouses, in order to prove a transmutation of property or a gift, the burden is on 
the party making the claim to prove the intent in question by clear and convincing evidence. 
Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 222 (1 983). As argued in Defendant's Brief on Appeal, in 
the refinancing scenario, involving spouses, the Court must look to parol evidence to  
determine whether a transmutation or a gift, has been proven by clear and convincing 
evidence. If it is not, then there is a great injustice done to the clear and convincing 
evidentiary standard, regarding transmutations and gifts. Again, it is simply not right for a 
spouse who is refinancing a debt on hislher separate property, to lose hislher separate 
property, simply because they signed a quitclaim deed granting the property to both 
spouses. The Court must look to the surrounding circumstances and the intent of the 
parties' to determine, during the refinancing, whether the spouse who signed the quitclaim 
deed intended to create a community property interest, or rather, as is the case here (and 
in Hoskinson), whether the spouse was merely attempting to refinance a loan owed on her 
separate property, with no intentto transfer an interest to both spouses. Third, Barmore v. 
Perrone, 179 P.3d 303 (2008) is dispositive, as despite a properly executed quitclaim deed 
from husband to  wife, the intent of the parties' was reviewed to determine whether delivery 
of the deed was intended; or in other words, whetherthe grantor had the "intent to convey 
immediately". The Court did not only look to the deed, in Barmore. 
Idaho Code 532-906(2) simply does not apply, as it refers t o  property being 
transferred to the grantee spouse as hislher sole and separate property. It says nothing 
about community property. The factual scenario in this case deals with a purported 
transfer of Ann's separate property to community property, and not Greg's separate 
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property. Even if ldaho Code 332-906'(2) applies to this case, it merely creates a 
presumption, when the deed is signed, ldaho Code g32-906(2) (2007) and Bliss v. Bliss, 
127 ldaho 170, 174 (1 995). This shifts the burden to the other party, pursuant to IRE Rule 
301, to come forward with evidence to rebut the presumption, although the party who is 
seeking to prove the transmutation continues to carry the burden of persuasion. Blisg at 
174. The effect of the statutory presumption under IRE Rule 301 is that the party in whose 
favor the presumption operates is relieved from having to adduce further evidence of the 
presumed fact until the opponent introduces substantial evidence of the nonexistence of 
the fact. Id_ Here, Greg met his initial burden, with the quitclaim deed, and thus the 
presumption of ldaho Code g32-906(2) would work in his favor. Thereafter, it would be 
Ann's obligation to come forward with evidence to rebut the presumption. She can clearly 
do so. All of the evidence illustrates that there was no intent to transmute Ann's separate 
properiy into community property. Ann needed to refinance the Countrywide debt, on her 
sole and separate property, when she sold a portion of her Etna property to the Lovelands. 
During the refinancing, she was handed dozens of documents to sign, and she did not 
even remember signing the quitclaim deed. Ann had absolutely no intention of giving Greg 
any interest in her separate property. Ann would not have signed the quitclaim deed had 
she known that she was giving Greg a one-half interest. Ann and Greg did not discuss the 
possibility that Ann was giving Greg a one-half interest in the Etna property before or after 
Ann signed the quitclaim deed. In fact, the first time Greg brought up the issue that he had 
a one-half interest in the Etna property, was after the divorce complaint was filed. Greg 
agreed with ail of the aforementioned facts. Greg offered no testimony in support of his 
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claim that Ann's separaie property was transmilled, other than the quitclaim deed. All of 
this evidence must be considered, despite the fact that it may be parol evidence, for all of 
the reasons argued by Ann in Defendant's Brief on Appeal. When it is considered, it is 
clear that Ann has rebutted the presumption. Then, Greg is left with the burden of 
persuasion, and he cannot meet this burden, as all of the evidence is in Ann's favor 
Greg's last statutory argument is that the execution of the quitclaim deed is a valid 
marital settlement agreement, and thus, Ann transmuted her separate property into 
community property. Obviously, Ann disagrees with this argument. All of the reasons for 
her disagreement are oiitlined in Defendant's Brief on Appeal, and they need not be 
addressed, again 
2. Barmore v. Perrone requires the Magistrate to look to parol evidence in this 
case ,  and this issue was raised bv Ann at trial. 
Ann cited to Barmore v. Perr-, 179 P.3d 303 (2008), for the proposition that she 
did not intend to convey the property to Greg (i.e., she did not deliver the deed). Greg 
argues that this issue was not raised by Ann at trial. This argument fails. The ldaho 
Supreme Court in Barmore addressed the identical argument, and found that the issue had 
not been raised for the first time on appeal, and thus was to be considered. Id. 
Specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court stated as follows: 
However, Barmore argues that Perrone has raised this issue 
for the first time on appeal, and that it therefore was not 
preserved for appeal. Barmore is incorrect. Perrone argued to 
the magistrate court that the intent necessary to effect 
conveyance of the deed was lacking: 
It is therefore unequivocally clear that Mr. Perrone 
neither intended a gift or to transmute, presently, his 
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interest in the Star, ldaho property ... . Mr. Perrone 
clearly never intended to either gift or transmute his 
current interest in the Star, ldaho property but rather to 
duplicate the Simi Valley, California property (where a 
quitclaim deed was executed between Mr. Perrone and 
Mrs. Barmore) and where the proceeds were used to 
obtain the community property residence in Star, ldaho 
where again Mr. Perrone executed a quitclaim deed to 
Mrs. Barmore that would only become effective upon 
his demise, not upon her request for divorce. To 
validate a transmutation upon, these circumstances 
permits one party to mislead the other party and unfairly 
gain ownership of property that clearly never intended 
(sic) to be immediately transmuted. 
That argument is identical to an argument that delivery was 
lacking, since ldaho law has made clear that "delivery" and 
"intent to convey immediately" are synonymous terms. 
Id. Ann, throughout the trial, testified, and argued that she did not intend to convey the -
Etna property to Greg. Specifically, Ann testified that she had absolutely no intention of 
giving Greg any interest in her separate property; that she and Greg did not discuss the 
possibility that Ann was giving Greg a one-half interest in the Etna property before or aRer 
Ann signed the quitclaim deed; that the first time Greg brought up the issue that he had a 
one-half interest in the Etna property, was after the divorce complaint was filed; that she 
signed numerous documents at the closing, but she did not recall signing the quitclaim 
deed which was admitted as Plaintiff's exhibit 23; and that if Ann had known she was giving 
Greg an interest, she would not have signed the quitclaim deed. Ann also argued, in 
Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which was filed on July 
30,2007, that she had no intention of conveying the Etna property to Greg (see pages 17 
and 18). Thus, as she argued that she had no intent to immediately convey the property to 
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Greg, she argued thatthe deed had not been "delivered". The issuewas raised below, and 
Barmore applies to this case. 
Greg states in his brief that the deed was never recorded in Barmore. This is not 
true. Nowhere in Barmore is it stated that the deed was not recorded. Thus, the argument 
made by Greg to distinguish Barmore, must fail. Furthermore, the recording of a deed, 
does not mean that the deed was "delivered". Hartley v. Stibor, 96 ldaho 157, 160 (1974). 
Recordation of a deed merely creates a presumption of delivery. The key issue in 
determining whether a deed has been delivered (or whether the grantor had the "intent to 
convey immediately") is the intent of the grantor to pass immediate and present title to the 
property. Id. and Barmore. And as stated in Defendant's Brief on Appeal, "a deed never 
shows upon its face nor by the terms thereof a delivery, and parol evidence thereof must 
necessarily be admitted when the question of delivery arises." Barmore (citing to Whitney 
v. Dewey, 10 ldaho 63, 655, 80 P. 11 17, 1121 (1905).). Thus, in this case, regardless of 
the fact that the quitclaim deed Ann signed was recorded, the Magistrate should have 
looked to parol evidence to determine whether a delivery (or "the intent to convey 
immediately") occurred. 
I!. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Ann requests that this Court reverse the Magistrate's ruling that 
the Etna property and the funds held in Ann's attorney's trust account were transmuted 
into community property. Ann would further request, that this Court find, as a matter of 
law, that there was no transmutation, and thus the Etna property and the funds held in 
Ann's attorney's trust account are her separate property. Ann would also request that 
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the issue of the community property interest in Ann's separate property be remanded to 
the Magistraie for determination, based upon ihe evidence already presented. 
Respectfully submitted this =day of June, ZOO8 A 
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N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVLLLE 
GREGORY BARRETT, 1 
Plaintiff, 
1 L )z 
1 Case No. CV-2005-4852 I 
M 
vs. i MINUTE ENTRY ON z 
1 ORAL ARGUMENT -.A . , 
1 ON ISSUES OF APPEAL 
..A 
ANN MARIE BARRETT, -4 
1 
Defendant. 1 
On July 7,2008, at 10:OO A.M., the parties brought oral argument on appeal on this 
matter for hearing before the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, sitting in open couit at 
Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Daniel Williams, Court Reporter, and Ms. Grace Walters, Deputy Court. Clerk, were 
present. 
Mr. Royce Lee appeared on behalf of the plaintiff. Mr. Aaron Woolf appeared on behalf 
of the defendant. 
Mr. Woolf argued in mitigation. 
Mr. Lee argued in aggravation. 
Mr. Woolf then presented rebuttal argument. 
The Court will consider whether the Parole Evidence Rule will apply in this case and 
whether the case should be remanded back to the magistrate, and will issue an order after further 
research into the matter. 
r~ r; r. 
L. u \) 
Court was thus adjourned. 
c: Royce Lee 
Aaron Woolf 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
Gregory Paul Barrett, 
PlaintiffIRespondei~t, 
vs. 
Ann Marie Barrett, 
DefendantlAppellant. 
Case No. CV-05-4852 
OPINION AND DECISION 
ON APPEAL 
This is an appeal from the Magistrate Court of the Seventh Judicial District in and for the 
Coullty of Bom~eville, Honorable Earl Blower, Magistrate Judge. Am1 Marie Barrett appeals from 
the September 1 1,2007 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Property and Debt Division and 
Attorneys Fees which found that the signing of a Quitclaim Deed transmuted an Etna, Wyoming 
property into colnmunity property. 
1. 
FAGTUALANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND 
The parties were married onNovember 1,1997. Respondent filed for divorce on August 29, 
2005. A trial for divorce was held on June 18,2007 through June 22,2007. A Rule 54(b) Decree of 
Divorce was entered on July 3,2007 which divorced the parties effective June 22,2007. 
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All11 acquired a property in Etna, Wyoming in her first marriage to Kevin Spencer. In her 
1996 divorce from Spencer, An11 was awarded the Etna property. Spencer signed two quitclaim 
deeds giving Ann the sole interest in the Etna property. 
In August 1999 Aim sold part of the Etna property to Eric and Dawn Loveland. Ann sold to 
the Lovelands two and one-half acres, including her marital residence, for $88,500. Ann transferred 
the acreage and the home through a Warranty Deed. When Ann sold the property to the Lovelands, 
she owed Countrywide $122,355.54 on a loan secured by the Etna property. Ann applied the 
proceeds of the sale to the loan, leaving a balance of $34,000. An11 was required to pay off the loan 
during the closing of the sale of the property. In order to do so, A m  and Greg acquired a loan 
through the Bank of Star Valley for $35,881.55 and paid off the loan. At the time of the divorce, the 
debt owed to the bank of Star Valley was $23,086. 
At the closing for the sale of the property and the new loan, A m  and Greg signed dozens of 
documents related to the loan. Though they had the opportunity to examine the documents, neither of 
them read all of the documents. Among the documents was a quitclaim deed on the remainder of the 
Etna land, transfening the land to her and Greg. Alm says that she does not remember signing the 
quitclaim deed, though she admits that she signed the document as the docwnent bears her signature. 
In December 2005, after Greg had filed for divorce, Ann sold 2 acres of the Etnapropevty for 
$49,322.19 and improveme~lts on her property. $42,668.24 of the proceeds of that sale were placed 
in Ann's attorney's trust account. At the time of the divorce, the remaining property was appraised 
at $350,000. 
In the court's September 1 I ,  2007 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judge Blower 
found that the signing of the quitclaim deed transmuted-the Etna property, whichwas Am's separate 
property. 
,- '- C. 
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Ann filed a Notice of Appeal on September 14,2007. 
On May 14,2008 Ann filed her Brief on Appeal. 
On June 12,2008 Greg filed his Brief on Appeal. 
On Jul7,2008 the parties brought oral argument on appeal on this matter. The cowt took the 
appeal under advisement at that time. 
The Court has reviewed the record of the proceedings below and provides the following 
analysis and decision. 
11. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
District Court review of a Magistrate's decision is governed by Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure 83(a)-(2). All appeals from the Magistrates Division shall be heard by the District Court 
as an appellate proceeding unless the District Court orders a trial de novo. I.R.C.P. 83(b). This 
Court has not ordered that this matter be heard as a trial de novo, and therefore, this review is upon 
the record and has occurred in the same manner and upon the same standards of review as an appeal 
from the District Court to the Supreme Court. I.R.C.P. 83(u). 
In a District Court review of amagistrate court's ruling, the findings of the magistrate judge 
will be upheld if supported by substantial, competent though conflicting evidence. Barton v. Barton, 
132 Idaho 394,396,973 P.2d 746,748 (1999) citing Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431,436,860 P.2d 
634,639 (1993). The weight to be given evidence is within the trial court's province and will not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Tentinger v. McPhelers, 132 Idaho 620,977 P.2d 
234 (Ct.App.1999); Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110, 982 P.2d 945 
(Ct.App.1999); and Holley v. Holley, 128 Idaho 503,915 P.2d 733 (Ct.App.1996). Ifthefindingare 
supported, the collclusions of law then must be examined as to whether they are founded on a proper 
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application of legal principles. Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho 354, 356, 815 P.2d 1094, 1096 
(1991), I5entges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192,194,765 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Ct. App. 1988). 
The characterization of property is subject to h e  sound discretion of the trial court, and should 
be upheld in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Matter ofEliasen's Estate, 105 
Idaho 234 (1983). The District Court exercises free review over questions of law. Stevens v. Stevens, 
135 Idaho 224,227 (2000). 
The party challenging the findings has the burden of showing error, and the appellate cout will 
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Martsch v. Nelson, 109 Idaho 
95,100,705 P.2d 1050,1055 (Ct. App. 1985). Error may not bepresumed onappeal, andanappellant 
must make an affirmative showing of such error to prevail. Carpenfey v. X.R. Cattle Co., Inc., 108 
Idaho 602,701 P.2d 222 (1985). 
111. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Did the magistrate err in finding that the Quitclaim Deed executed by Ann, during a refinance, 
transmuted the Etna property from Ann's separate property to community property? 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
Appellant argues that the Magistrate failed to uphold the clear and convincii~g standard 
for transmuting separate property by enforcing the parol evidence rule. Ustick v. Uslick, 104 
Idaho 2 15, 222 (1 983) requires, "where it is asserted, as in this case, that a spouse intended to 
transmute property or to make a gift, the burden is on the party urging the assertion to prove the 
intent in question by clear and convincing evidence." 
.- 
Under the pmol evidence rule, when a coiltract has been reduced to a writing that the 
parties intend to be a final statement of their agreement, is not admissible to vary, contradict, or 
p,, !.. 
&Lid 
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enlarge the terms of the written contract. Simons v. Sinzons, 134 Idaho 824, 828 (2000). 
Par01 evidence may be considered to aid the trial court in determining the intent of the 
drafter of a document if an ambiguity exists. Matter ofEstafe of Kirk, 127 Idaho 8 17 (1 995). 
Respondent argues that the quitclaim deed is clear and unambiguous and that it complies 
with the various Idaho statutory requirement s for conveyances of real property and transfers 
between spouses. 
At trial, Appellant urged the magistrate to adopt the reasoning he had applied in the 
case of Hoskinson Y. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448 (2003). The facts in Hoskins are similar to those 
at hand, except in Hoskiizson the parties had signed two quitclaim deeds. In his findings of fact 
from Irloslcinson, the magistrate considered par01 evidence when he held: 
[Tlhe parties offered conflicting evidence of tlie intent behind the quitclaim deeds. 
Elizabeth testified that Reed asked her to sign a quitclaim deed to facilitate the 
financing and that she refused to sign uiltil Reed agreed to sign a deed conveying 
the property to her and Reed. Reed denied that allegation. He testified he signed 
the quitclaim deed simply because the lender presented it to him during the loan 
closing, that he signed it along with many other papers the lender presented to 
him, and that he had no intent to transmute his property into colnmunity property. 
Reed notes that he alone signed the promissory note for the new loan. Under 
these circumstances, the court finds that Elizabeth has not proved a transmutation 
by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence did not establish that Reed 
intended to make a gift to the comnunity. The evidence did not establish whether 
the deed to Reed and Elizabeth was signed before or after the deed to Reed. As 
noted above, Elizabeth damaged her credibility with her lack of candor during her 
testimony on other issues; therefore, the court is inclined to believe Reed's 
testimony on the issue. 
Hoskinson, 139 Idaho at 459-60. 
The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the magistrate's decisioil in Hoskinson that the 
holder of a quitclaim deed "failed to sustain her burden of proving a transmutation." Id. at 
Appellant contends that the magistrate should have considered her intent when 
r J ? ?  
L* V 3- 
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she signed the quitclaim deed, as tlte magistrate did in Hoskinson. In Hoskinson, the 
magistrate considered the defendant's testimony that he only signed the quitclaini deed 
because "tlie lender presented it to him during the loan closing, that he signed it along 
with maiy other papers the lender presented to him, and that he had no intent to 
transmute his property into cominunity property." Id. at 359. In this case tlie magistrate 
refused to consider such evidence in detenniniilg the characterizatioil of the property. 
Respondent argues that Hoskinson is factuallydistinguishable from this case. The 
respondent contends that there was an ambiguity in the quitclaim deeds in the Hoskinson 
case not found here. However, the Hoskinson case did not iilvolve ambiguity in the 
document itsele the ambiguity arose from the circumstances surrounding the separate 
quitclai~ii deeds, including the existence of two deeds. Any ambiguity in this case would 
also arise from the circumstaices surrounding the quitclaim deed; the magistrate found 
that the quitclaim deed itself was unambiguous. 
Appellant also cites to the case of G r f j n  v. Grf jn ,  102 Idaho 858, (Ct. App. 
1982), where the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed a magistrate's opinion finding that $10 
trailsmutatioil had occurred even though the parties had signed a loan agreement stating 
that the title to the property would vest in both parties. The court in GrifJin explained that 
"the existence of the plaintiff's signature on the deed of trust in all likelihood can be 
explained away as a precautionary measure required by a prudent creditor." Griffin, 102 
Idaho at 861. 
Gviffin is factually differentiable froin this case. As Respondent points out, the 
court in Grvjn  held that there was no transmutation because there was no deed to the 
wife, not because of ambiguity in a deed. Respondent argues that the reasoning behind 
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Grrjrjn would demand the finding of a transmutation in this case, where Appellant signed 
a deed. However, the finding in GvifJin is not based on the existence or nonexistence of a 
deed, but rather in the lack of clear and convincing evidence that a transmutation took 
place. The court explained that the statements on the loan application explicitly assigning 
the parties to a joint tenancy "offer some support to appellant's translnutation argument, 
but they are not predominant." Id. 
Respondent argues that Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170 (1995) is a more accurate 
comparison to this case. In Bliss, there is no trallsmutation of separate property to 
community property. Instead, in Bliss the husband conveyed his interest in community 
property to the wife through a quitclaim deed. Bliss at 173-74. This conveyance of 
property is ruled by I.C. 5 32-906(2) which creates a that the conveyed 
property is separate. The court held that the quitclaim deed was unambiguous and that the 
conveyance was valid. Iiowever, the presulnption in I.C. 5 32-906(2) is wildly different 
from the Ustick standard which requires clear and convincing evidence of intent to 
transmute separate property into commu~lity property. Additionally, the appellant in Bliss 
claimed to have conveyed his interest to avoid taxation; the conveyance did not arise out 
of a refinancing arrangement. 
Similarly, the case of Hull v. Hull, 116 Idaho 483 (1989), also cited by 
Respondent, refused to allow par01 evidence in a case where the parties had received a 
home and the deed had been unambiguous. The husband's grandparents had given the 
parties a home, accompanied by a deed that read "for value received." Hall at 484. The 
magistrate had considered testimony from the husband's gratldmotller that the 
conveyance was intended as a giR, and the Idaho Supreme Court remanded the case back 
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with the instruction to ignore the parol evidence testimony. Id. Again, the Hall case did 
not deal wit11 the transmutation of separate property into community property and had 
nothing to do with a refinancing agreement. Significantly, the Hall case, like the other 
cases cited by Respondent, does not invoke the high demands of the clear and convincing 
standard Usticlc requires. 
Appellant appears to argue for a standard requiring courts to examine parol evidence 
whenever there is a conveyance of properly related to 3 refinancing situation. This court does not 
find in the caselaw any hint of a mandate requiring courts to always consider parol evidence 
However, it is apparent - that courts are granted much broader leeway in considering parol 
evidence in situations where an otherwise unambiguous document is part of a refinancing 
situation. In such situations, parties often sign many documents that neither side prepared. These 
documents are generally prepared by a third party seelting to protect its interests alone. Appellant 
presented testimony and evidence that she did not intend to grant a one half interest to 
Respondent and that she signed the document simply because the lender presented it to her. In 
such situations, the intentions of the palties are rarely clear simply from reading a document 
prepared by a third party. Intention of a transmutation can only be shown by clear and convincing 
evidence. Here, the magistrate should have considered parol evidence before determining that 
there was clear and convincing evidence of a transmutation 01 separate to community property. 
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v. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the magistrate is reversed. The court remands to the magistrate for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
/ 
Dated this & day of August, 2008. 
I 
n 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY 
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT, 1 
1 Case No. CV-05-4852 
Plaintifl, 1 
1 ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF 
vs . 1 FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
1 OF LAW ON PROPERTY 
ANN MARIE BARRETT, 1 AND DEBT DIVISION 
1 FOLLOWING REMAND 
Defendant. 1 
In his August 29, 2008 Opinion and Decision on Appeal, District Judge Jon J. 
Shinduriing remanded this case with instructions to consider par01 evidence in 
determining whether the plaintiff proved a transmutation of the "Etna property" by clear 
and convincing evidence. Applying that standard, the court concludes that the plaintiff 
did not meet his burden of proof. Although the defendant signed a quitclaim deed 
purporting to convey the Etna property to herself and the plaintiff, other evidence 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS FOLLOWING REMAND 
p , ,.&* 
1 
S;u 1 
indicated that she did not intend a gift to the plaintiff. That evidence includes the 
following: (1) the defendant's testimony that she did not intend to give the plaintiff an 
interest in the property but signed the deed only because it was presented to her by a 
lender as part of a refinancing process; (2) the relatively sinall amount of the refinance 
loan ($34,512) coinpared to the fair market value of the property (at least $350,000); (3) 
the absence of any discussion between the parties about any intention to ~nalce a gift; and 
(4) the defendant's testimony that she continued to consider repayment of the refinance 
loan to be her responsibility. 
Because the court now concludes that the Etna property and the proceeds from the 
Wyonling 100 sale are the defendant's separate property, the defendant's separate 
property estate n~ust reimburse the co~nrnunity estate $13,772 for the reduction in the 
principal of the original and refinance mortgage loans accoinplished with the use of 
colnmunity funds. Additionally, the defendant, not tlle community, should be solely 
responsible for the repayment of the refinance loan. 
The court directs the defendant's attorney, Mr. Woolf, to prepare an amended 
judgment consistent with these findings and conclusions. 
Dated September 17, 2008. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certifj that on the fi day of September 2008,I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon, by facsimile, or by causing the same to be hand delivered. 
Y 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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P.O. Box 50160 
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Royce B. Lee 
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THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF &ANDERSON, PLLC 
3480 Merlin Drive 
P.O. Box 50160 
ldaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 525-8792 
Fax (208) 525-5266 
Attorneys for Defendant, Ann Marie Barrett. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
MAGISTRATES DIVISION 
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT, ) 
) Case No. CV-05-4852 
Plaintiff, ) 
1 MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
VS. ) 
) 




COMES NOW, Defendant, Ann Marie Barrett, by and through her attorney of 
record, Aaron J. Woolf, Esq., of the law firm of THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF & 
ANDERSON, PLLC, and hereby moves this Court for to reconsider its Addifional 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law on Property and Debt Division Following Remand, 
which was entered on September 17, 2008. This Motion is based upon the Court file, 
and I.R.C.P. Rule lI(a)(Z)(B), 52(b), and 59(e). In support thereof, Defendant argues 
and requests as follows: 
This Court found, in its Additional Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law on 
Property and Debt Division Following Remand, which was entered on September 17, 
2008, that the proceeds held in Ann's attorney's trust account (proceeds for the 
Wyoming 100, LLC in the amount of $42,668.24) are Ann's separate property. As the 
Court will recall, the parties paid for community expenses in the amount of $6,653.70, 
out of these funds, during the pendency of the action. The expenses incurred, were as 
follows: $1,500.00 to Dr. Lindsey for the custody evaluation; $1,480.56 to GMAC 
Mortgage for payments on the 140 N. Adam property; $300.00 to Dr. Lindsey for the 
custody evaluation; $600.00 to Dr. Lindsey for the custody evaluation; $2,433.00 to the 
ldaho State Tax Commission for the parties' taxes; $450.00 to Amy Sheets for 
mediation; $6.37 to Zip Print for copies; and $33.77 to Zip Print for copies. See 
testimony and see Plaintiff's exhibit 31. 
A debt incurred during marriage is presumed to be a community debt. Gardner 
v. Gardner, 107 ldaho 660, 662 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984). When separate funds of one 
spouse are used for the benefit of the community, such as payment of debt arising from 
acquisition of community property, the separate estate is entitled to reimbursement of 
the amount expended (including the interest portion), absent clear and convincing 
evidence that a gift of separate funds was made or intended. Ustick v. Ustick, 104 
ldaho 215 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983). Although there is no case directly holding that a 
spouse's separate estate is entitled to be reimbursed for contributions made to the 
community estate, regardless of whether the payment was related to an underlying 
asset, attorney Bruce Collier has written a very scholarly and thorough discussion of 
community and separate reimbursement claims in divorce actions, which article was 
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published in The Advocate, September, 2002 Edition, p. 14, and attached as exhibit A 
to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which was filed on 
July 30, 2007. Mr. Collier concludes that "when the separate estate contributes to the 
community estate in a way that benefits the community estate, even if no specific 
community property is improved or equity in any community asset is enhanced, 
reimbursement for the amount contributed is allowed unless a gift is established." In his 
article, Mr. Collier cites to ldaho authorities to support his conclusion. And finally, it has 
been held that the community is entitled to reimbursement for Husband's separate tax 
liability paid by the community during marriage. Swanson v. Swanson, 134 ldaho 512 
(2000). 
Based upon the above legal authority, the community should be ordered to 
reimburse Ann's separate estate in the amount of $6,653.70. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED thi Gay of September, 2008. 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a licensed attorney in ldaho, with my office in 
aday of September, 2008, 1 served a true and correct ldaho Falls, and that on the 
copy of the following-described document on the parties listed below, by mailing, with 
the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be hand delivered 
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Royce B. Lee, P.A. 
Attorney at Law 
770 South Woodruff Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 
Telephone: (208) 524-2652 
Facsimile: (208) 524-2051 
Idaho State Bar #I691 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT, ) 
) Case No. CV-05-4852 
Piaintiff/Appellant, ) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
ANN MARIE BARRETT, ) 
) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, ANN MARIE BARRETT, AND THE 
PARTY'S ATTORNEY, AARON WOOLF OF THOMPSON, SMITH, WOOLF & 
ANDERSON, PLLC, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, Gregory Paul Barrett, appeals against the above 
named Respondent, Ann Marie Barrett, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
Opinion and Decision on Appeal entered in the above entitled action on the 
29" day of August, 2008, the Honorable Judge Shindurling presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -1 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders 
under and pursuant to Rule l l (a) (2) ,  I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then 
intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal 
shall not prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal: 
a. Whether the District Court Judge on appeal erred by remanding the case 
to the trial court with instructions to consider par01 evidence on whether a 
Quitclaim Deed, by Ann Barrett of her separate property to Greg Barrett 
and Ann Barrett as husband and wife, constituted a valid transmutation of 
her property to community property. 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
5. Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. It has already been prepared for the 
appeal to the District Court. 
6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included or excluded in 
the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, 
I.A.R.: Court orders regarding custody, visitation and child support do not 
need to be included in the clerk's record. 
7. Icertify: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -2 
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter. 
However, the reporter's transcript has already been prepared for the prior 
appeal to the District Court. 
b. That the clerk of the district court has not been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript because a transcript has already 
been prepared. 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
d. That the appellate f iling fee has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on this 8th day of October, 2008, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was served upon the following party as indicated: 
Aaron Woolf, Esq. 
Thompson, Smith, Woolf & Anderson, PLLC 
3480 Merlin Drive 
P.O. Box 50160 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0160 
[ ]HAND DELIVERY 
[X]U.S. MAIL 
[ ]FAX NO 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -4 
RECEltJED 
lF.iAliO SUPREME C01JRT 
cQt,!flr k>F ApP5AL.S 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT, 1 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
PlaintifT/Appella~lt, OF APPEAL 
\ 
I 
VS. 1 Case No. CV-2005-4852 
ANNE MARIE BARRETT, 
1 
1 ~ o c k e t  NO. 3 57 b 
Appeal from: Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County 
Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, presiding. 
Case number fro111 Court: CV-2005-4852 
Order or Judgment appealed from: Opinion and Decision on Appeal, entered 8-29-08 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Attorney for Respondent: 
Appealed by: 
Appealed against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? 
If so, name of reporter: 
Dated: October 14, 2008 









CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1 
AARON J. WOOLF 
ldaho State Bar #5791 
THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF & ANDERSON, PLLC 
3480 Merlin Drive 
P.O. Box 50160 
ldaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 525-8792 
Fax (208) 525-5266 
Attorney for DefendantIAppellant, Ann Barrett. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT, ) 
) Case No. CV-05-4852 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs . ) AMENDED RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
1 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
ANN MARIE BARRETT, 
Defendant 
COMES NOW, Defendant, Ann Marie Barrett, by and through her attorney of 
record, Aaron J. Woolf, Esq., of the law firm of THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF & 
ANDERSON, PLLC, and hereby files this amended response to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration, which was filed on or about October 3, 2008, as follows: 
1. Ann is in complete agreement that the 278 N. Contour property should be 
treated identically to the Etna, Wyoming property. Thus, Ann is in agreement with the 
278 N. Contor property being classified as Greg's separate property. 
2. The parties' stipulated that if the Court found that the real property and 
mobile home at 278 N. Contor, to be Greg's separate property, then Greg's separate 
property interest would be 22.04% (see the attached Exhibit " A  for a copy of the 
transcript from trial) of the equity and the community property interest would be 77.06% 
interest of the equity. At the time of trial, the parties stipulated that the value of the 
mobile home and real property was $67,000.00 (see Defendant's Exhibit "M"). 
Furthermore, the debt owed to Wells Fargo, which was secured by the real property 
and mobile home was $40,165.85 (see Plaintiff's Exhibit "26"). Thus, the total equity in 
the real property and mobile home is $26,834.15. Pursuant to the stipulation of the 
parties, Greg's separate property interest in said equity is $6,010.85 ($67,000 - 
$40,165.85 X 22.04%), and the community property interest, which should be awarded 
to Greg, is $20,823.30 ($67,000 - $40,165.85 X 22.04%). 
3. In the Court's Judgment and Order on All Remaining Issues (Property and 
Debt Division and Attorneys Fees), entered September 11, 2007, Greg received the 
278 N. Contor property as community property, with a net equity of $26,834.15. He will 
continue to receive said property, but his community interest should now be listed at 
$20,823.60, for a difference of $6,011.00. 
4. Based upon the above, Ann would owe Greg an additional $3,005.50 in 
regard to the ultimate equalization payment, and this should be considered in Ann's 
Motion to Determine Final Equalization Payment. 
DATED this a d a y  of October, 2008. 
AMENDED RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RE - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am a licensed attorney in ldaho, with my office in ldaho 
Falls, and that on the z d a y  of October, 2008. 1 served a true and correct copy of the 
following-described document on the parties listed below, by mailing or by facsimile, with 
the correct postage thereon, or by causing the same to be hand delivered 
DOCUMENT SERVED: AMENDED RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Royce Lee, Esq. ailed El Hand Delivered CI Fax 
Attorney at Law 
770 S. Woodruff 
ldaho Falls. ID 83401 
Fax: (208) 524-2051 
AMENDED RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
12 MR. WOOLF: No objection. 
13 THE COURT: Nine is admitted then. 




(Discussion heid of f  the record.) 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 0  marked.) 
Q (By Mr. Lee) Greg, I ' d  like to show you 
Exhibit No. 10. 
A Okay. 
Q What is that  documerit? 
A This is a Quit Claim Deed. 
Q Who is i t  from and who Is it to? 
A GI-eg Barrett to Greg and Ann Darrett. 
Q What property has been conveyed by this Quit 
Claim Deed? 
-,- 
I Commerce referring to the Ca. ,Ie home as 
I 
2 security. I s  this the Promissot Note you took out in 
3 purchasing this Cavco mobile home? 
4 A I beiieve so. 
5 Q Who signed t i le loan documents? 
6 A It says Greg Barrett and Ann Barrett. 
7 Q Are these documents correct records reiating to 
8 the Cavco mobile home? 
9 A I believe tiley are, yes. 
10 MR. LEE: I move to introduce Exhibit No. 9 
I 1  into evidence. 
A The property a t  278 North Contor Avenue, Idaho 
Fails, Idaho, 83401, Bonnevilie County. 
Q And is this recorded i n  the Bonneville County 
records? 
A Yes. 
Q And is that your signature on there? 
A Yes, i t  is. 
Q Does this relate to the same property where the 
Cavco mobiie home is located? 
A Yes. 
Q So this one is dated December 23rd and a loan 
was -- your loan was dated November 29th and this was 
dated December 23rd. After your loan was In  place you 
signed a Quit Claim Deed putt ing Ann's name on the 
ownership? 
A That's what we  did, yes. 
Q Can you teil us the circumstances around this 
Quit Claim Deed? 
. . . . - 
- - 
1 A. I beli: s 2s. 
2 MR. LEE: Move to introduce Exhibit 10. 
3 MR. WOOLF: No objection. 
4 THE COURT: Ten is admitted. 
5 ( ~ l a i n t i i i ' s  Exhibit No. 10 admitted.) 
6 Q (By Mr. Lee) Now, your loan was already - -  i t  
7 looks l ike your loan was already in piace before you 
8 did the QuiL Claiiii Deed, is t i ~ a t  i iow you I-emeli~ber i t? 
9 A (No response.) 
10 Q Weil, I ' m  not sure, we'li come back to that .  
11 So when you put  Ann's name on this Quit Claim 
12 Deed you had already declared the m o b ~ l e  home to be 
13 reai properly? 
14 A That's correct. 
Q And so by putt ing Ann's name on the Quit Claim I 
Deed, what was your understanding of what happened a: 
a result? 
A That made Ann a part owner of the home and the 
lot and all the property connected together. 
Q Do you remember you and Ann talking about this 
question, what i t  means to put  her name on the Quit 
Claim Deed? 
A I t  was jus t  that  we were going to refinance the 
property and we were going to have It in both names. 
I was giving i t  to lher. 
184 
1 Q Did you and she talk about that? 
2 A Maybe briefly. 
3 Q Do you recail any specific conversations 
4 between you and Ann when you did this - -  
5 A I just know that  we were going Lo do i t  and we 
6 were going to  refinance the whole property and Ann's 
7 name was going to be on it. 
a Q So what was your interpretation of the legal 
effect of putt ing her name on that paper? 
A She was now part  owner of the property. 
Q And what part is hers? 
A Ail. I t 's  all of it, she's part owner of all 
of it. 
Q And equal owner wi th you? -: 
A Oh, yes. 
Q As community property and sucii? 
A Yes, that 's correct. 
MR. LEE: And, Your Honor, for the record 
24 Q I s  tl?is Exhibit No. 10 a true and correct copy (., . ,24 the court finds that  the land is Greg's separate 
25 of tha t  Qi i i t  Claim Deed? Li, 4 ' 25 property, then his separate property portion of the 
19 A We wanted to do a refinance and the mortgage 
20 company wanted i t  to be real property, is that the 
21 term,.instead of personal property, and so we changed 
22 i t  over and made it real property and put  i t  i n  both 
23 names. 
19 aqree on the price and there is a reference on Exhibit 
20 A about how that price is actualiy divided up if need 
21 be based on some additional testimony, That's i n  the 
22 other explanation column over here. 
23 MR. WOOLF: So it 's m y  understanding that i f  
.. .- -- 
1 equity ;vouid be 22.4 percent. r o  ? 1 property; cc '5 
MR. LEE: Correct. A Yes. 
3 MR. WOOLF: And if he finds that  it's community Q So teii us your position on who should get this 
: / 4 property it's immaterial. So essentiaiiy we  agree / 4 i tem 
1 / s that i f  the Court finds Greg has a separate property / 5 MR. WOOLF: And for the record, Your Honor, 
interest in  the reai property that it would be 22.4 
percent. 
TliE COURT: Thel-e's a stipulation to that 
effect; I-ight? 
MR. LEE: Yes. 
MR. WOOLF: Yes. 
THE COURT: I ' m  sorry, how much o f  this is 
stipulation wliere she says in her comments $52,000 
represents tlie vaiue of the mobiie home, $15,000 
represents the value of the land? Did the parties 
agree on that? 
MR. WOOLF: Yes, for that -- those are In the 
stipulations as weii. 
MR. LEE: Right. For t l ieir values we agree. 
THE COURT: So then the dispute is with regard 
t o  whether -- now let's see. Sorry. How much of 
the -- sorry, how. much of the $67,000 is community 
pl-operty and how much is separate property? 
MR. LEE: That is the dispute. And I have t o  
say the entry on Exhibit A under the husband's column 
, a lo t  and a doubie-wide mobile 
A Yes, that's correct. 
Q And that, for the record, on Defendant's 
o. 5. I t  appears we have a 
value at $67,000. Do you feei 
colnfortabiewith that price? 
a difference of opinion about who 
Each o f  you are asking for t l i ls 
your position is on who should get 
r. 17 




1 where it. says Plaintiff agrees with the above, that's 
2 not quite correct. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LEE: We need to probably cancel that out. 
THE COURT: All right. 
t he re i s  a stipuiation f rom our standpoint regarding 
the vaiue a t  $67,000 and that it is community 
property, and that stipulation is contained i l l  t l ie 
wri t ten slipuiation filed with t i ie ~ o i r r t  as weii. 
MR.LEE: Okay. Good. 
MR. WOOLF: The only dispute is who receives 
this property. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WOOLF: I s  that  right, Royce? 
MR. LEE: That's correct. 
Q (By Mr. Lee) So tel l  us your position on who 
should receive the property a t  140 North Adam. 
A I ' m  just going to be frank and say it's 
entirely up to t l ie Judge to decide whicl i way i t  goes. 
Either way is okay with me. 
Q All r ight. Tliey either get $67,000 worth of 
property o r  $67,000 wor th  of credit on something else 
A I ' d  be happy either way, siire. 
Q And does that depend somewhat on how the resi 








I A That is correct. 
2 Q Right now who iives at this property? 
3 A Arin does. 
4 Q Ann and her three children and the two boys 
5 then are living here a t  the present t ime? 
6 A That's correct. 
7 Q Let's move up to the next line where we talk 
8 about Katie Court. Has there been a recent sale of 
6 MR.'LEE: So the dispute is whether it became 
7 community property o r  not. 
8 MR. WOOLF: And if It didn't, then Greg's 
9 separate property port ion of the equity would be 22.4 
10 percent. 
11 MR. LEE: Correct. 
12 Q (By Mr. Lee) So I ' m  going to move u p  our  
13 Exhibit No. 7 one more line and we arrive at 140 North 
9 that property? 
l o  A Yes. 
I I THE COURT: jus t  a second. 6 8 1  Katie Court, 
12 there i t  is. Ali righty. Now wait a minute. 
13 MR. LEE: I should have e-mailed my extra 
14 property list. - 
15 THE COURT: The property were just talking 
16 about was -- 
17 MR. LEE: 140 North Adam. 
18 THE COURT: --  140  North Adarn and I put m y  
19 notes under 181  North Adam. All r ight.  Let me move 
20 thein. All r ighty. Sorry.  Now we're on 681'Katie 
21 Court. The way you ' re  throwing me here is you're 
22 going u p  the list instead of down the list. 
23 MR. LEE: I know. I shouldn't have done that, 
i 24 I know. 
2 5  Q (By Mr. Lee) Ail r ight. Let's talk about 681  
Royce B. Lee, P.A. 
Attorney at Law 
770 South Woodruff Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 
Telephone: (208) 524-2652 
Facsimile: (208) 524-2051 
Idaho State Bar #I691 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT, ) 
) Case No. CV-05-4852 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 1 
) AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
ANN MARIE BARRETT, 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, ANN MARIE BARRETT, AND THE 
PARTY'S ATTORNEY, AARON WOOLF OF THOMPSON, SMITH, WOOLF & 
ANDERSON, PLLC, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, Gregory Paul Barrett, appeals against the above 
named Respondent, Ann Marie Barrett, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
Opinion and Decision on Appeal entered in the above entitled action on the 
2gth day of August, 2008, the Honorable Judge Shindurling presiding. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL- -1 
JR?" 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders 
under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a) (2), I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then 
intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal 
shall not prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal: 
a. Whether the District Court Judge on appeal erred by remanding the case 
to the trial court with instructions to consider par01 evidence on whether a 
Quitclaim Deed, by Ann Barrett of her separate property to Greg Barrett 
and Ann Barrett as husband and wife, constituted a valid transmutation of 
her property to community property. 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? No. 
5. Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. It has already been prepared for the 
appeal to the District Court. It should be included as a part of the Clerk's 
record. 
6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included or excluded in 
the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, 
I.A.R.: Court orders regarding custody, visitation and child supportdo not 
need to be included in the clerk's record. 
7 .  Only the following exhibits should be included in the Clerk's record. Such are 
the exhibits which relate to the issue on appeal. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL -2 
28J- 
Plaintiff's Exhibit.Numbers - 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 
Defendant's Exhibit Numbers -A, B, C, D, E, F, G ,  H, I ,  J ,  K, L, M, P. 
8. Only the following pleadings should be included in the Clerk's record as they 
are the only pleadings which relate to the issue on appeal 
a< Verified Complaint for Dissolution of Marriage 8/29/05 
.k Verified Counterclaim for Dissolution of Marriage 9/14/05 
K Answer 9/14/05 
MAnswer to Counterclaim 9/16/05 
sd Stipulation 
,fY Minutes Report of Court Trial, June 18 to June 22, 2007 
3.. Decree of Divorce 7/03/07 
h-rDefendant's P roposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 7130107 
i: Plaintiff's Post Trial Memorandum 7/31/07 
j: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Property and Debt Division 
and Attorney Fees 9/11/07 
k. Judgment and Order on All Remaining Issues (Property and Debt Division 
and Attorney's Fees) 911 1/07 
d" Notice of Appeal to District Court 9/14/07 
x rx  Defendant's Brief on Appeal 5/14/08 
P laintiff's Brief on Appeal 6/12/08 
.a Minute Entry on Oral Argument on Issues of Appeal 7/08/08 
-Opinion and Decision on Appeal 8/29/08 
to additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Property and Debt 
Division Following Remand 9/17/08 
-r-r Motion to Reconsider 9/23/08 
s/ Notice of Appeal to Supreme Cpurt 10/08/08 
i.r Clerk's Certificate of Appeal 16/16/08 
9. 1 certify: 
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter. 
However, the reporter's transcript has already been prepared for the prior 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL -3 2s-b 
appeal to the District Court. The reporter's transcript should be included as 
a support exhibit of the Clerk's record. 
b. That the clerk of the district court has not been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript because a transcript has already 
been prepared. 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid. 
d. That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
;ua t to Rule 20. 4f3 
DATED this 3 day of 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL -4 2 ~ 7  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on this ~ 3 0 ' ~  day of October, 2008, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the following party as indicated: 
Aaron Woolf, Esq. 
Thompson, Smith, Woolf & Anderson. PLLC 
3480 Merlin Drive 
P.O. Box 50160 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0160 
[ ]HAND DELIVERY 
[X]U.S. MAIL 
[ ]FAX NO 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL -5 /bif 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVIELE COUNTY , 
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT, 1 
1 Case No. CV-05-4852 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 ORDER WITHDRAWING 
vs . 1 "ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF 
1 FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
ANN MAME BARRETT, 1 OF LAW ON PROPERTY 
1 AND DEBT DIVISION 
Defendant. 1 FOLLOWING REMAND" 
1 
Upon further inspection of the court's file, it appears that the District Court did not 
issue a remittitur pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(z)(2)(A) and that the plaintiff timely filed a 
Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court: from the District Court's August 29: 2008 
Opinion and Decision on Appeal. Accordingly, this court should not have entered its 
September 17, 2008 "Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Property 
and Debt Division Following Remand" and now withdraws the same. 
Dated November 5, 2008. 
ORDER WITHDRAWING ADDITIONAL 
CONCLUSIONS FOLLOWING REMAND 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 2 day of November 2008,I served a true and correct copy 
ofthe foregoing document on the persons listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon, by facsimile, or by causing the same to be hand delivered. 
ORDER WITHDRAWING ADDITIONAL FINDINF$fj 
CONCLUSIONS FOLLOWING REMAND B w  
Aaron J. Woolf 
P.O. Box 50160 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
FAX (208) 524-545 1 
Royce B. Lee 
770 South Woodruff Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
FAX (208) 524-2051 
~u r t l r t house  Box US Mail 
FAX Hand Delivery 
6 u r t h o u s e  Box 0 US Mail 
FAX Hand Delivery 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF RONNEVILLE 
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT, 1 AMENDED 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
PlaintiffiAppella~it, 1 OF APPEAL 
VS. 1 Case No. CV-2005-4852 
) 
ANNE MARIE BARRETT, 1 Docket No. 
Appeal from: Seventh Judicial District, Bonlleville County 
Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, presiding. 
Case nulnber from Court: CV-2005-4852 
Order or Judgment appealed frorn: Opiflion and Decision on Appeal, entered 8-29-08 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Attorney for Respondent: 
Appealed by: 
Appealed against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? 
If so, name of reporter: 
Dated. November 18, 2008 









Clerk of the District Court 
B y p 6 '  
eputy Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT, ) 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 1 
1 
VS. ) Case No. CV-2005-4852 
1 
ANNE MARIE BARRETT, 1 Docket No. 35763 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
1 
County of Bonneville 1 
I, Ronald Longnlore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do liereby certify that the above and foregoing Record in tlie 
above-entitled cause was conipiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete 
Record of the pleadings and documents as are auto~natically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that only tlie exhibits requested, in the above-entitled cause, will be duly 
lodged with tlie Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript (if requested) and 
Clerk's Record, tlie followi~ig is a list ofrequested exhibits.: 
Transcripts: 
Volulne I (~~~ 
Volume I1 
Plaintiffs Exhibits: 
7. Real Property List 
8. Loan Payoff 
9. 24x 48 Mobile Home 
10. Quit Clairn Deed-Contor 
11. Katie Ct. Loall Docs 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1 
12. Tennis Ct. SaleDocs 
13. Tennis Ct. Deed 
14. Loan Doc- Tennis Ct. 
15. Payments-Tennis Ct. 
16. Katie Ct. Proceeds 
17. Warranty Deed-Tennis Ct. 
18. Warranty Deed-Etna 
19. Spencer Divorce Decree 
20. Quit Claim-Etna 
22. Closing Stunt-Etna 
23. Quit Claim-Etna 
24. Promissory Note-Etna 
25. Mortgage-Etna 
26. Debt List 
27. Purch Agnnt-Etna 
28. Warranty Deeds-Etna 
29. Subdivision-Etna 
30. Develop Status Ernail 
3 1. Def s Trust Act Stmt 
32. Appraisal-Etna 
33. Access Change Permit 
34. Access Change Appl 
Defendant's Exhibit: 
A. Cornbilled Property List 
B. Wrnty Deed-Lovelands 
C. Loan Disclosure 8/12/99 
D. Check-Country Wide 8/99 
E. Pay-Off as of 7/22/07 
F. Letter Dated 0/15105 
G. Check from WY 100 LLC 
H. Photos (hey 89 Gate) 
I. Wrnty Deed Contor 
J. Loan for Contor Prop 
I<. Wells Fargo Loan Docs 
L. Quit Claim Deed 11/23/07 
M. Stipulation 6/15/07 
P. Rental Income/Expense 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and aFfixed the seal of the said Cou~t  this 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTI-I JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT, ) 
) CERTIFICATE 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) OF SERVICE 
VS. 1 Case No. CV-2005-4852 
1 
ANNE MARIE BARRETT, ) Docltet No. 35763 
1 
DefendantlRespondent. 1 
8 1 HEREBY CERTIFY that 011 the %day of December, 2008,I served a copy of the Repo~ter's 
Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in the above entitled 
cause upon the following attorneys: 
Royce B. Lee, Esq. 
770 S Woodruff Avenue 
Idaho Falls, ID 83401 
Aaron J. Woolf, Esq. 
P.O. Box 
Idaho Falls, ID. 83405 
Anovney for AppeNan! Attovneyfor Respondent 
by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an ellvelope addressed 
to said attorneys at the foregoing address, whicb is the last address of said attorneys known to tne. 
RONALD LONGMORE 
CERTlFICATE OF SERVICE - 1 
AARON J. WOOLF 
ldaho State Bar #5791 
THOMPSON SMITH WOOLF & ANDERSON, PLLC 
3480 Merlin Drive 
P.O. Box 50160 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Teleohone (208) 525-8792 
Fax i208) 525-5266 
Attorney for Respondent, Ann Barrett 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
GREGORY PAUL BARRETT, ) 
) Case No. CV-05-4852 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs . ) ORDER 
) 
ANN MARIE BARRETT, ) 
) 
Defendant ) 
BASED UPON the Stipulation entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant, by 
and through their respective attorneys of record, and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following documents shall be added to the 
Clerk's Record on Appeal: 
a. Defendant's Reply Brief on Appeal which was filed on or about June 30, 
b. Plaintiff's exhibit 21. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the hearing currently scheduled for February 2, 
2009 is vacated. 
DATED this A day of February, 009 7 
NOTICE OF ENTRY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was on the 1 day of 
February, 2009, provided to every party affected thereby, as follows: 
Aaron J. Woolf, Esq. Mailed 'ti3 Hand Delivered U Fax 
Thompson Smith Woolf & Anderson, PLLC 
3480 Merlin Drive 
P.O. Box 50160 
ldaho Falls, ldaho 83405 
Fax (208) 525-5266 
Royce Lee, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
770 S. Woodruff 
ldaho Falls, ID 83401 
Fax: (208) 524-2051 
Mailed hd Hand Delivered Fax 
2 .  Ida
Deputy 
ORDER 
